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FOREWORD
The future of the Global War on Terror is now, and may continue
indeﬁnitely to be, a key concern for U.S. military and policymakers.
Islamist terror has not arisen from a vacuum, but has evolved over
decades and requires more calibrated coordination and a different
type of strategic planning than other types of conﬂicts. The author
of this monograph, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, examines the intensity and
diversiﬁcation of extremist efforts and outlines their “new jihad”
and its relationship to the regeneration of extremist leadership. She
reviews “lessons learned” with regard to Islamist extremist tactics,
recruitment, and their relationship to a broader Islamic awakening
which must be factored into the U.S. desire for democratization
of the Middle East and the broader Islamic world.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
as a contribution to the national security debate on this important
topic.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
If America’s pursuit of a Global War on Terror is strategically
and politically well-grounded, then why are Islamist insurgencies
and extremist movements continuing to operate, generating parallel
cells that terrify the world with violent attacks from Iraq to London?
While analysts debate the intensity and longevity of the latest
round of terrorist attacks,1 we would do well to consider whether
U.S. long-term goals in the war on terror—namely diminishing
their presence and denying terrorists the ability to operate, while
also altering conditions that terrorists exploit—are being met. If we
are not pursuing the proper strategy or its implementation is not
decreasing support for terrorists, then we should adapt accordingly.
This monograph addresses these questions and examines the
efﬁcacy of proposed or operative strategies in light of the evolution
of Islamist jihadist leaders, ideas, and foot-soldiers. Jihadist strategy
has emerged in a polymorphous pattern over the last 30 years, but
many Americans only became aware of the intensity of this problem
post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), and through observation of the 200305 insurgency in Iraq.
The author proposes that extremist (jihadist) Islamist groups are
not identical to any other terrorist group. Islamist discourse, and
extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given
the ﬁscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its
coordination may be at odds with great power competition,2 and
certainly contests the interests of other smaller states (like Iran), why
are we aiming at eradication, rather than containment, and is eradication possible? Differentiating a “true Islam” from the false and
destructive aims of such groups is an important response. Each
region-based administration has so crafted its anti-terrorist rhetoric,
and Muslims, in general, are not willing to view their religion as
a destructive, anachronistic entity, so this unfortunately difﬁcult task
of ideological differentiation is an acceptable theme. But it is insufﬁcient as a strategy because Islamist insurgencies have arisen in
the context of a much broader, polychromatic religious and political
“Islamic awakening” that shows no signs of receding. That broader
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movement informs Muslim sentiment today from Indonesia to
Mauritania, and Nigeria to London. Ofﬁcial statements will not
diminish recruitment; deeds, not words, are needed. Finally,
eradication may be impossible, but containment is philosophically unattractive. A combination of eradication (denial) and cooptation, as we have seen in the Muslim world thus far, probably
makes sense. Certain assumptions that underlie U.S. strategies of
denying and diminishing the terrorism of Islamist extremists therefore need to be reconsidered.
Among the recommendations made in this monograph are:

1. Revise strategies that too narrowly or too broadly deﬁne
extremist networks and their operational modes.
2. Acknowledge the evolution and change of Islamist extremist
leadership and develop strategies to contain it. Utilize those
who know the extremist bases of operations well and speak the
appropriate languages instead of relegating this enormously
difﬁcult task to those who have no deep understanding of
the area, ideological issues, or delicacy of the issues.
3. Focus on antiterrorist as well as counterterrorist principles.
4. Understand and respond to the increasing sophistication of
Islamist tactical and strategic efforts.
5. Carefully consider the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East and in other areas of the Muslim world on the
stated aims of the Global War on Terror.
6. Continue working with local governments in their counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts.
7. Establish centers for international counterterrorist operations
to speciﬁcally address Islamist extremists (rather than all
global forms of terrorism).
8. Avoid the use of physical and psychological torture and
extralegal measures.
9. Encourage local governments to normalize relations with
Islamist groups, and utilize dialogue programs or amnesty
efforts in order to return supporters of jihad to society.
10. Recognize the potential of moderate Islamist groups and
actors to participate in political processes. This does not mean
vi

that moderate or “progressive” Islamists as deﬁned in urban
American settings can serve as mediators or spokespersons
for counterparts in the region.
11. Extra-governmental diplomacy should be used to achieve
mutual understanding on the relevant issues or obstacles to
a more “global” pursuit of the Global War on Terror.
12. Establish a multi-country, full media (Web, television, radio,
and print) program to discuss and debate Islamist and other
forms of religious extremism.
13. Stay the course in promoting democratization of the Middle
East and the Muslim world.
14. Provide advanced training to military, intelligence, and
political leaders on the history, evolution, and tactics of
Islamist extremists.
ENDNOTES - SUMMARY
1. Dexter Filkins and David Cloud argue that insurgents in Iraq are stronger,
more sophisticated, and being quickly replaced. See “Defying U.S. Efforts,
Guerrillas in Iraq Refocus and Strengthen,” New York Times, July 24, 2005. On the
other hand, George Friedman claims that al-Qaeda’s global counteroffensive is a
weak last-ditch effort. See “Al Qaeda’s Global Campaign: Tet Offensive or Battle
of the Bulge? Stratfor, July 26, 2005, at http://www.strafor.biz/Story. Nora Bensahel
of RAND explains that charting short-term trends in insurgent violence can be
very misleading, hence we should measure progress against them with different
yardsticks. See Commentary, “Gauging Counterinsurgency,” Baltimore Sun,
August 9, 2005, at http//www.rand.org/commentary.
2. Stephen D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005, pp. 16-21. What is of interest to
me are Biddle’s astute perceptions about the nature of international competition
and the costs of a transformational policy like the Global War on Terrorism. In the
next section of the monograph, Biddle suggests that only radical political reform
will address terrorism in the Middle East, but I do not see the end of terrorism as
the only possible, or most likely, result of such reform, nor has such reform really
begun. Rather, states and elites are resisting these processes, and the Iraqi and
Afghani cases illustrate the difﬁculties of simultaneously building states, reforming
preexisting structures and behaviors, and ﬁghting extremism and terrorism. Lack
of space prohibits a full exploration of these issues in this monograph.
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A HUNDRED OSAMAS:
ISLAMIST THREATS
AND THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
NEW CONFLICT, OUTDATED STRATEGY?
The U.S. Government launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the Global War on Terror
(GWOT) in response to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and
in alliance with various nations. Many other nations objected to the
U.S. invasion of Iraq on the grounds that Saddam Hussayn’s region
did not, in their views, pose a credible Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) threat as was claimed at the time, and because they believed
that American dismantlement and occupation of Iraq would surely
be interpreted as neocolonialist interventionism. Indeed, Islamist
extremists labeled these as Crusader campaigns, capitalizing on the
preexisting understanding of neocolonialism and fear of Western
antipathy to Islam. In March 2003, President Hosni Mubarak of
Egypt predicted that the American-led war on Iraq would create
“one hundred new bin Ladens.”1
The mushrooming of Islamist-extremist movements predates the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, emerging from the late 1970s through the
early 1990s. Prior to 9/11, certain academic and security experts from
within the region predicted continuing Islamist threats and further
development of the broad-based Islamic resurgence in the Middle
East, and beyond, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America.
However, local security services, police, and the military in Muslim
and Middle Eastern states, including Israel, had been engaged in
the containment of Islamist radicals. Their governments pursued
two basic strategies, including mass arrests and judicial processes,
assassinations, and repression on the one hand, or co-optation and
political bargains on the other.
Islamist extremism predated 9/11. The United States had
developed policies against terrorist groups, including Islamist
extremist organizations earlier, but 9/11 created an impetus and
urgency for a more successful strategy of opposition to these groups.
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One could argue that America has not met its most important goals
in the GWOT, as it has been deﬁned since 9/11, in terms of denying
sanctuary to terrorists, preventing further violence, and diminishing
the growth of extremists. One might further argue that constraining
factors are U.S. dependence on allied paramilitaries and militaries
that carry primary responsibility in counterterrorist activities, for
instance, in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other nations; and that the
irregular nature of the combatants stymies our own military approach,
or it is unsuited to what is essentially a police/security services issue.
But the problem is deeper because of certain assumptions that fund
various efforts the United States has made in the hopes of destroying
or diminishing violent extremism.
Certain miscalculations, preventable or not, are now part of the
calculus of battle with insurgents in Iraq. Here the U.S. understanding of extremist leadership and strategic communications of the
Islamists may indicate the nature of battles to come. There is some
disagreement about how badly the effort is going, and many hope
that the establishment of democratic institutions in Iraq, along with
the will of the majority of the Iraqi people, will help turn the tide
against the insurgents. At the time of this writing, a high price has
been paid. In 2005, the U.S. military launched counterinsurgent
operations in Najaf, Fallujah, Mosul, Qaim, and Karabila near the
Syrian border, but the frequency of insurgent attacks, particularly
suicide bombings, increased from 69 in April to 90 in May 2005, and
even more in June (killing more than 1,350 from April 28 to the end
of June). Coalition deaths were 52 for April, 88 for May, and 83 for
June, while 199 Iraqi military and police died in April, 270 in May,
296 in June, and 125 by mid-July. By October 25, 2005, 2,000 American
troops had been killed in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declared a war
on Iraqi Shi`a in August and September of 2005. No one really knows
how many Iraqi civilians have died since the initial invasion; the
Iraq Body Count and Oxford Research Group reported 25,000 Iraqi
deaths since March 2003 in a dossier released in July 2005, but the
Iraqi government disputed some aspects of the report. We do know
that, due to the insurgency, about 12,000 Iraqi civilians have perished
over the 18 months up to July 2005, a rate of about 20 people per day.
According to data provided by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, this
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amounts to about 800 Iraqi civilians, military, and police deaths per
month, not counting deaths during U.S. military operations or those
in the Kurdish areas.2 Previous data indicate that the largest number
of victims have been Shi`i Iraqis,3 and more Shi’i mosques or clerics
were reportedly attacked than others, but Kameran Qaradaghi, a
spokesperson for the Iraqi president, commented that the interior
ministry’s data show that civilians of all types and ages are targets,
and he denigrated the notion of “honest resistance.”4
This exceeds the frequency of attacks carried out by Palestinians
in the tense 2001-03 period of the al-Aqsa intifadha. In addition,
recent attacks in Iraq have featured larger bombs, which have
been increasingly lethal.5 Although some ofﬁcials depicted the
insurgency as waning, June, July, and August featured many brutal
attacks. General Richard B. Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, stated on July 21, 2005, that the attacks on U.S. troops were
increasingly lethal and that assassinations of Iraqi ofﬁcials had
mounted.6 Attacks on Iraqi civilians are polarizing because they
exacerbate sectarianism, and those on police and military recruits
constrain U.S. efforts to speedily build up Iraqi military and police
capacity. It is important to note that the insurgency, in both Islamist
and nationalist aspects, is not an isolated phenomenon restricted
to Iraq; it is part of a trend. We can call this a bi- or tri-regional,
or even a global, insurgency. Even if one would not go that far,
suicide attacks in Egypt in October 2004, and April and July 2005
are certainly ominous; as are continuing attacks in Afghanistan; the
bombings in London on July 7, 2005, and the attempted bombings
on July 21, 2005; multiple bombings in Bangladesh; and many other
incidents.
Both the “local” and the global nature of the threat should alarm
the United States and its allies in the GWOT. Consider just a few of
the major attacks launched since 2001:
•

a suicide attack in April 2002 at a Tunisian synagogue killed
19 people.

•

the bombing of a Bali nightclub packed with foreigners in
October 2002. On October 1, 2005, three suicide bombers
attacked three restaurants, killing 20.

•

ﬁve suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003.
3

•

bombings in front of two Turkish synagogues in November
2003 that killed 20 and wounded 300.

•

Al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)’s violent attacks
and bombings in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 2003
through 2004 including a beheading, and one attack launched
on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah.

•

a bombing at the Australian embassy in Djakarta in 2004.

•

violence and bombings from January 2004 through May 2005
in southern Thailand.

•

attacks on Shi`a mosques and Ashura celebrations in Iraq and
Pakistan.

•

bombing of early-morning commuter trains in Madrid on
March 11, 2004.

•

the October 2004 hotel bombing at Taba, close to Eilat in the
Sinai.

•

bombings in December of 2004 in General Santos and February
2005 bombings in Manila by Abu Sayyaf.

•

a March 2005 car-bombing in Doha, Qatar, in Yemen.

•

the Shabab al-Mu’minun’s (an Islamist extremist group)
clashes with the Yemeni government through 2004 and again
from March to May 2005. Also Yemeni al-Qa’ida members
who surfaced elsewhere in the Peninsula. Yemen had already
faced a strong challenge from insurgent cleric Shaykh alHouthi and killed him, but in the spring of 2005 followers of
al-Houthi’s father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, mounted attacks.

•

British-born Muslims from Leeds attack the London underground and a bus killing 37 and injuring more than 700 on
July 7, 2005. These were followed by foiled attacks on July 21
in London by a different set of terrorists.

•

3 bombs in Sharm al-Shaykh are set off also in July 2005 at a
resort town in Egypt’s Sinai peninsula which killed more than
88 people and injured more than 200.

•

Just a few of the many attacks in Iraq included a bombing
near a propane fuel tanker on July 16, 2005, south of Baghdad
that resulted in a huge explosion, killing more than 60 and
4

wounding more than 100; a fuel truck bomb on July 17, killed
98 people south of Baghdad, just as car bombs were also
detonated in the Iraqi capital; insurgents killed Iraqi soldiers
guarding a water plant north of Baghdad, as well as Algerian
diplomatic staff members on July 27, and then attacked a train
oil tanker. A suicide bomb attack was followed by the killing
of new recruits to the Iraqi Army on July 29, and the next day
two British private security agents were killed after an attack
on a convoy in Basra; journalist Steve Vincent, who had been
reporting on Basra police involvement in assassinations there,
was kidnapped and assassinated on August 2; the next day a
powerful improvised explosive device (IED) made out of three
bombs put together killed 14 Marines and their translator in
an amphibious assault vehicle near Haditha; Arab diplomats
and embassy staff were kidnapped and assassinated, and alQaeda announced it would try victims in an Islamic court;
182 people were killed in a series of attacks in Baghdad in
September 2005.
•

200 homemade bombs exploded at government buildings,
courts, and in the streets in at least 60 different towns and
cities of Bangladesh following Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s
departure on August 17, 2005, for China.

•

62 people died and more than 200 were injured in a triple
bombing in Delhi, India, on October 29, 2005. Islamic militants
are suspected.

•

Three Christian teenage girls were beheaded in Central
Sulawesi, Indonesia. Their bodies were discovered on October
29, 2005.

During the same post-9/11 time frame, Islamist suicide bombers
were less active in Israel in response to a changing political situation
and uneasy truce, but inter-Palestinian conﬂict increased the public’s
trust in Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah as compared to the
Palestinian Authority (PA). In the tumultuous period prior to the
2005 Gazan disengagement, the “secular” al-Aqsa Brigade ﬁghters
somewhat paradoxically claimed they would go to Iraq as mujahidin
if only they could, since they are being repressed by the Authority.7
5

The Iraqi insurgents increasing use of car bombs, suicide attacks,
kidnappings, and beheadings, and the fact that they have begun
targeting foreign diplomats and diplomatic staff points to their efforts
to heighten jihad before Iraqi stabilization can dismantle their latest
sanctuary. There are a large number of extremist groups, and each
has gone through transitions over the last 2 years. The signiﬁcance
of Abu Mus`ab Zarqawi’s group’s Jama`at al-Jihad wa al-Tawhid (the
Group of Jihad and Unicity8) adoption of a new name, Tanzim Qa’ida
Jihad ﬁ Bilad al-Raﬁdayn (Qa’ida Organization of Jihad in the Land of
the Two Rivers) was that Zarqawi swore loyalty (the bay`a) to Usama
bin Ladin. Bin Ladin constructed a unique oath as follows:
I recall the commitment to God, in order to listen to and obey my
superiors, who are accomplishing this task with energy, difﬁculty, and
giving of self, and in order that God may protect us so God’s words are
the highest and his region victorious.9

Zarqawi then entered a second tier of bin Ladin’s lieutenants. By
this linkage of Iraqi groups to bin Ladin, Islamist extremists were
proclaiming to the world that the United States might have driven the
Taliban into the Afghan hinterland and dismantled the government
of Saddam Husayn, but they would wage jihad wherever possible.
And they will do so until their deaths and beyond.
It goes without saying that we should distinguish those groups
and individuals who have perverted Islamic principles from
ordinary Muslims. On the other hand, it will not aid us to apply
a universal strategy to all extremists and insurgents, or to forgo
critical assessments of outcomes over time. And there is no uniﬁed
or universal goal for all extremists, whereas Islamist extremists do
assert similar aims. For instance, we commonly hear experts state
that the goal of terrorism is to terrify. But Islamist extremists aim
for much more: withdrawal of Western forces and even businesses
from Iraq, Palestine, and the “land of Muhammad,” meaning Saudi
Arabia; the dissolution of secular governments in the Muslim world,
and transformation of Muslim societies, cleansing them of doctrinal
innovation. All of this is to occur through the waging of jihad.
Young ﬁghters, in particular, exhibit certain individual and
organizational characteristics found in gang cultures. But can we
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apply the same anti-gang tactics developed elsewhere in the world
by penetrating schools, neighborhoods, and families? These young
men, for the most part, will accept no pay-off. Co-optation aimed
at the leadership level might be a temporary solution. However,
jihadist leaders often compete with moderate groups who believe that
building a broad popular base is the ﬁrst order of business and work
with secularist governments if they need to. Extremists have usually
avoided cooperation with secularist governments, fearing they will
taint their jihadist image. These ﬁghters use the term al-qa’idin (the
sedentary folk) to ridicule and condemn those who will not adopt
jihad. They recruit and are recruited through a belief in a recentlydeﬁned Islamic mission, or da`wa, and the gloriﬁcation of jihad and
martyrdom. We must not discount their ideological motivation,
their recruiting talents, and ability to sustain morale, or we will not
defeat them. While we have spoken often of encouraging the forces
of moderate, conservative, or even liberal Islam to compete with the
extremists, we need to remember that previous efforts of this sort
on the part of Arab and Muslim governments did take place. Those
efforts established a tension between authoritarian, Big Brother-like
states and mobilization efforts by ordinary members of society.
Around the time that most Egyptian Islamists crafted a deal
with their government forswearing violence in the wake of the
1997 Luxor attack on tourists, many academics were emphasizing
the moderate potential of Islamism. Co-optation seemed a strategy
preferable to repression. Certain French experts claimed that radical
and political Islam had decreased, although it would be more true to
say that despite ongoing Islamization (in places like Pakistan, Egypt,
Lebanon, Nigeria, and the Kelantan province of Malaysia), Islamists
had not achieved their political goals. A host of “Islamic Republics”
like Iran had not emerged. One could point to Afghanistan or Sudan,
but certainly no caliphate.
How could these individuals support a thesis of “post-Islamism”
after 9/11? Giles Kepel, a French specialist on Islamist extremism in
this camp, argues that 9/11 was merely an end-stage paroxysm, part
of the death throes of radicalism.10 This may be similar to current
American claims that Iraqi insurgents are in their last throes of
violence, for if jihad is transported from Iraq to other locations, the
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GWOT will continue. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director
Porter Goss pointed out that “Al-Qaida is only one facet of the threat
from a broader Sunni jihadist movement” and that “the Iraq conﬂict,
while not a cause of extremism, has become a cause for extremists”
and that economic development there has proceeded more slowly
than hoped because of the insurgency.11
In the last 4 years, nonregionalists primarily responsible for the
remapping of counterterrorism moved the discussion of Islamist
threats away from regionalist oversight. This meant that more
individuals with little in-depth knowledge of the area’s complex
religio-political, ideological, or cultural history were in charge
of developing strategies toward it. They brought in experts, or
individuals from the region, but had no ability to discriminate between
the different suggestions made or views proffered. Other difﬁculties
arose because of the contradictions between the strategies of nationand democracy-building and the need to destroy or contain Islamist
cells and organizations that may directly threaten Americans and as
American interests in the region, as well as allied governments.
Current U.S. grand strategy toward terror is hampered by
disagreements about the deﬁnitions of global “terror” and the failure
to address the speciﬁc nature of Islamist-extremist terror in that
strategy. In other words, our analysis of the conﬂict and the deﬁnitions of the enemy are unclear and remain so. This is true of many
governmental agencies, and the media as well. In the wake of the
London bombings, Fox News correspondents blasted the BBC for
removing the term “terrorist” from their coverage. Others are still
debating the conversion of the term “terror” to “insurgency.” Next
came a disagreement about converting the phrase “war on terror”
to the “struggle with extremism.”12 To some degree, the urgent need
for a response to a continuing threat is clouding our vision and
statements. Al-Qa’ida’s 2001 attacks were vivid declarations of a state
of warfare, just like the attack on the USS Cole, unfortunately misread
by some. But they were also the logical progression of jihadist efforts
underway for nearly 3 decades. Since regional governments tried
various tactics which we now mirror (from expulsion to combat,
and incarceration to amnesties), we need to review their failures,
understand where we may be reinventing the wheel, and build a
strategy should we be unable to contain extremist Islamism.
8

The lessons of regional strategies are confusing precisely because
the proponents of the carrot or stick tend to abide by their preferred
method despite the incomplete success or outright failure of both
strategies. And other political processes and Islamization were
affecting these nations simultaneously. Middle Eastern and Muslim
governments often tried to contain Islamists simultaneously while
some elements in the military apparently colluded with or made
little effort to capture militant Islamists, as in Western Pakistan.
Elsewhere (for instance, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) one could observe
security and governmental agents simultaneously torturing,
excluding, and radicalizing some Islamists, while being inﬂuenced
by other Islamists who had become part of the government structure.
Another strategy is to recognize certain Islamist parties or groups as
legitimate political actors (Lebanon, Iraq). Or governments (like Saudi
Arabia’s) alienated and eliminated radicals but communicated with
neo-salaﬁsts who forswore violence and cooperated with the state.
Nonetheless, no effort was made to transform their core values, which
are not much different from the radical extremists (Saudi Arabia). Or
militaries and intelligence services like the Israelis targeted political
leaders since military apparatuses of the radical groups were less
vulnerable. They have discounted the possibility of negotiating with
Islamist moderates to promote a transition of Palestinian Islamists
from opposition to moderate political actors. In Iraq, our military
has targeted particular locations in wipe-out mode, while seeking
throughout the country to limit sanctuary. But in fact, the militants’
strategy has been so successful that Americans and foreigners cannot
venture anywhere without being in a position of strength or without
protection.
A NEW JIHAD
Why has Islamist extremism been so pervasive, so easily
franchised, and so difﬁcult to extinguish? A new Islamist discourse,
produced by the Islamic awakening (sahwa Islamiyya) since the
1970s, has inﬂuenced and been inﬂuenced by a “new jihad,” which
has coalesced and evolved since the mid-1980s and 1990s. The new
jihad, in turn, qualitatively has affected the capabilities of extremist
leaders and the behavior of combatants.
9

What’s New about the New Jihad?
It posits a World Islamic Front, promoting and aggrandizing
battle against Western nations and local “apostate” governments,
without sparing civilians. Members of this Front may appear at
will, as they did in carrying out the London bombings. No-one need
carry a card, or provide the authorities with recordings of cellular
telephone calls to Afghanistan or Pakistan; instead, as one longtime
resident of the bombers Leeds’ neighborhood stated, “they need to
understand, al-Qa’ida is inside [in the heart].”
It is malleable and opportunistic, utilizing new types of alliances.
Groups who aim at the “far enemy” (the United States, other Western
nations, and Israel) may ally with groups seeking local autonomy, or
with moderates.
It is not anti-modern. Such a large body of literature may now
be cited to support this claim that it would be impossible to discuss
or enlist all of the sources.13 On the sociological and psychological
levels, Farida Adelkhah has described “the new Islamic man,” and I
have written about “the new Islamic woman,” which helps explain
the internalization of the Islamist message.14 Earlier, in the wake
of the Islamic revolution in Iran, some experts chose to emphasize
Islamists’ echoes of pre-modern themes such as the medieval scholar,
Ibn Taymiyya, who disliked a Muslim ruler’s cooperation with the
Mongol conquerors.15 But Ibn Taymiyya was far more tolerant in
many ways than those Islamists who emerged in the 1960s, like
Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, and those of 1970s to be discussed below. We
need to remember that analysts at that time were trying to explain
social features that had not yet transformed under modernization
along with anti-Westernism. Remember, too, anti-Westernism is not
equivalent to anti-modernism.
Other reasons for common mischaracterization of jihadis as
barbarians with cars and Websites, throwbacks, or medieval monsters
have to do with 1) certain non-Muslims’ (and even some Muslims’)
difﬁculty in comprehending the historicity of the Islamist message
which is also revisionist, and expressed in truly modernist language;
2) most Westerners have deﬁned modernity with a secularist lexicon
as have many liberal Muslims; 3) some rely on “cultural” deﬁnitions
of the “Other” that incorrectly posit them as purely non-Western,
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when most are hybrid. We can see quite clearly that today’s jihadists
are Western trained and possess technical and analytical skills. They
use the Internet, cellular messaging, chat rooms and e-linked faxes
more adeptly than larger organizations with physical recruitment
centers. The pathologizing of terrorism causes us to say that their
minds “work differently” than ours—when the issue is really one of
different values and disassociative techniques. In other words, the
jihadi believes, or convinces himself, that his immoral acts of violence
are moral, but this in no way impairs the modern logic patterns of
his brain.
The new jihad has broken with classical doctrines of jihad and
“the law of nations” (siyar) as well as Muslim modernist or reformers’
reconstructions of jihad in the 19th and 20th centuries. The classical
doctrines of jihad speciﬁed the most permissable form to be between
Muslims and polytheists or unbelievers waged “in the path of God,”
although jihad could also be conducted against apostates, Muslims
who had rejected their faith, revolutionaries, brigands or deserters,
and in some cases, members of other monotheistic faiths. However,
strict rules applied to jihad; under the siyar, the Muslim “law of
nations,” it might be an individual duty as opposed to a collective duty, and was differently governed if it applied to land controlled by Muslims or non-Muslims.16 Ethics and rules of conduct
were meant to limit brutality and the cycles of vengeance it could
unleash, and yet we see today’s jihadis engaged in vicious kidnappings, beheadings, and wide-scale attacks on civilians that would
be forbidden under classical understandings of jihad.
The modernist or reformer’s approaches to jihad were developed
with a cognizance of the military and political upper-hand of the
West. They sought to limit the rationale for jihad (for instance, only
when one was prevented from carrying out the duties [or pillars] of
Islam) or to redeﬁne it in terms of the lesser (military) and greater
(personal striving or goal-setting) jihad, or to provide substitutes for
ﬁghting such as economic support, or charity.
An Islamist explains:
Muslim scholars “capitulated” to Orientalist (Western) critiques and
falsiﬁed facts in order to say “Now, [jihad] is not obligatory anymore,
since the cause has disappeared. We hold that jihad has no other aim
than defense of our lives and the country we live in.”17
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Wahhabism, the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and some
other Gulf states, decried this “demotion” of jihad’s importance, as
did the extremist Islamists. So a central feature of the new “jihad” is
that it is a consistent duty and was incapable of being bounded via a
peace treaty as was true of the classical deﬁnition.
It is fostered through a different approach to acquired knowledge;
tarbiyya more than ta`lim. Ta`lim means education in the sense of
enlightenment. Tarbiyya involves training and socialization, and, for
militants, military information, strategy, rationalizations for violence,
and a construction and gloriﬁcation of jihad and jihadi history.
It rejects democracy and democratic institutions because they
promote or allow secularism, and are usually deﬁned by Western
sources to mean more than pluralism and representative government,
which Islamists may not, in fact, reject. The problem with democracy
for Islamists is that it provides an alternative to Islamic governance
which should, ideally, be conducted via shura, or consultation. The
fact that shura is similar to other forms of elite consultation, or to
representative governance that advised monarchs or strong executive
branches is the reason that many Muslims also can argue that Islam
is not incompatible with democracy. Islamists on the other hand,
argue that shura provides popular participation, but that pluralism
or democracy are not innately Islamic.
Unfortunately the conﬂicting messages conveyed by U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East and the Islamic world which include
promotion of the GWOT, democratization, and maintenance of U.S.
strategic goals actually has intensiﬁed the new jihad’s magnetic appeal
to Muslims of varying backgrounds. The reasons for this stem in part
from Muslim and Middle Eastern antipathy to foreign intervention.
But also, in this age of instant information and interconnectivity, it
is easy for them to see the myriad misinterpretations of their culture
and religion, as well as the enormous hostility to Islam and Muslims
on the part of Western commentators, whether on the worldwide
web or in the media in nearly all reporting of events in the region, on
the GWOT, and in discussions of security and immigration, both in
Europe and the United States.
Muslims may desire representative government, and some may
even support verbal interventions that will spur their governments
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to reform, but they may not prefer Western-style democracies or
other political features. Or they may truly resent U.S. support for
Israel and the seeming lack of stronger pressure on nondemocratic
governments like Saudi Arabia or Syria to reform. Still others may
dislike the arrogant tone of American statements about the necessity
of reform, as if only our nation can determine the shape that reform
can take.
Problems with Strategic Responses.
Many disagreements over the proper response to “al-Qa’ida
and its afﬁliates” have taken place. Will they reshape the way the
United States and other nations deﬁne irregular or asymmetric
challenges? Certainly this shift in terminology prevailed after
Islamist insurgents in Iraq sabotaged reconstruction efforts. U.S.
Government spokespersons and the American media at ﬁrst
identiﬁed former Ba`thists or Iraqi nationalists as “the insurgents,”
not mentioning or seemingly unaware of the Islamist insurgents at
ﬁrst. Cooperation between these three elements was another ominous
feature of the situation. In devising a new strategy against terrorism,
U.S. policymakers have prepared both too large and too restricted
a canvas. Ignoring much of the knowledge previously acquired
about Islamist extremists—the lessons learned in Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Israel/Palestine, Algeria, Pakistan, and elsewhere, ofﬁcials
worked with the deﬁnition of terrorism as a “global” phenomenon.
This deﬁnition did not take account of features that appeal or have
special relevance for Muslims because, according to its articulation,
terrorism could be identiﬁed with any religion or ideology.
But then, the speciﬁc efforts of intelligence, fact-ﬁnding,
and analysis sought to highlight al-Qa’ida and its “network” or
association as Enemy No. 1. By highlighting the differences between
al-Qa’ida and world jihad networks and other organizations with
more limited territorial objectives, the United States could more
easily claim a strategic victory if bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida or any of a
few groups thought to be directly connected to him were eliminated.
This predominant approach is truly questionable for a number of
reasons:

13

•

First, all nations possess local, regional and international
goals. The United States has, in fact, recently iterated bold new
goals in the Muslim world which have caused Muslims to see
a continuing and intensifying interventionism extending into
the indeﬁnite future.
For example, President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union
message suggests that only the force of human freedom
will “stop the rise of tyranny,” and that the United States
must eliminate “the conditions that feed radicalism and the
ideologies of murder.”18 In March 2005, he related this theme
more speciﬁcally to the broader Middle East, parts of which
have “been caught for generations in a cycle of tyranny and
despair and radicalism” and further suppressed through
dictatorship. So not only the defeat of extremists, but a
transition to free nations, which incidentally require the “full
participation of women,” “new thinking,” the encouragement
of democracy, economic progress, political modernization,
honest representative government, the “rule of law,” and
patience and resolve are needed to reach these ends.19
These are worthy goals, but they produce several question
marks: 1) Who designated the United States as the ultimate
authority determining the future of the broader Middle East?
(Can we imagine a State of the Union delivered in Iran or Saudi
Arabia that laid out speciﬁc goals for the transformation of
America?) 2) Doesn’t this transformational strategy resemble
the liberal and Western efforts against Arab socialism and
nationalism, and the British as well as American approaches
to communist inﬂuence in the broader Middle East in years
past? 3) Where is the role of Islam in this anticipated Middle
East? and 4) Would not democratization enlarge the role of
Islamists in the region?

•

Second, targeting a narrow list of groups such as al-Qa’ida,
the Zarqawi network, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, alQa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula, and possibly the Jama’at
Islamiyya of Indonesia excludes others who also oppose
their home governments and the United States and engage
in violence. Actually, many other organizations with local
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territorial or political goals share a great deal with al-Qa’ida
and similar groups. They recruit and derive local support
because people identify with certain themes, for example,
freedom and justice that may be part of governmental rhetoric
but which do not appear to be genuine values. Violent groups
have and may continue to interact with moderates, or those
not directly linked to al-Qa’ida. Both types derive support
from the much broader Muslim awakening, or renovatio20 that
also features a new Islamic discourse.21
•

The provision of a convenient hit list, like the post-invasion
deck of cards representing Iraqi ofﬁcials, or chart of Zarqawi’s
captured or slain amirs, or QAP’s most wanted, underscores
the successes of counterterrorism, and enhances the political
fortunes of the successful anti-insurgent/extremist strategists.
Unfortunately, the scorecard against radical actors does
not reﬂect their regeneration or ability to appear in a new
guise in an entirely different region. Nor do such targeting
methods help us understand extremist “networks,” alliances,
or associations that may merely be temporary unions, or
marriages of convenience.22

The U.S. inability to properly analyze or construct effective
strategies for the GWOT has many causes:
•

For obvious reasons, large numbers of analysts and
contractors have been drawn from Europeanist or Soviet
studies backgrounds or a general security focus to an Islamic
world focus. They lack necessary regional training, language
skills, and requisite ﬁeld experience. In addition, the Foreign
Area Ofﬁcer’s typical language skills are based on 1 or 2
years of Arabic language study and do not sufﬁce for needed
communications or intelligence skills. Because of geographical
transfers and other reasons, 4-year programs may not be
required. Even graduates of lengthier programs are not
able to comprehend key material on the Defense Language
examinations. Native speakers were not widely recruited,
but when they are, it is frequently for work as contractors
without specialized security policy knowledge; they may be
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drawn from any professional ﬁeld. Lack of experience in the
region outside the cocoon of the military base or embassy is
an even greater deﬁcit because analysts do not understand the
worldviews shaping the actors and individuals they study.
•

The United States most critically encountered the expansion
in Islamist-terrorist capabilities in Iraq. There, the Coalition’s
immediate needs—to rein in insurgents and pursue
reconstruction simultaneously—left little time for deep
reﬂection and careful analysis.

•

Disagreements about the nature of the threat, as described
above, confuse and misdirect policymakers. Also many,
including some in the Department of Defense (DoD) and
the Department of State (DoS), fault Islam or Islamic culture
or the Islamic lack of development or reform, rather than
Muslim miscreants for the explosion of Islamist extremism.
This even though the U.S. National Security Strategy declares
that “terrorism” can be anywhere and should be disassociated
from the practice of Islam.23 The resulting confusion reﬂects
ignorance of Islam, its discourse and history, and also political
factors and divisions between factions. Some fear alienating
the Muslim world and others have no such sensitivities;
some also support or doubt the potential for socio-political
transformation in the Muslim world.

•

Similarly divided ideas on the future of Islamist extremism
tended to sideline many experts who could shed more light
on the problem, as with the example of those writing about
post-Islamism—a term inspired by post-modernism and
the “end of history,”24 or those who have studied the nature
and development of salaﬁst and other Islamist groups. This
is not necessarily a conscious omission but a feature of the
compartmentalization of disciplines and lack of time to “read
outside the box,” as well as think there.

•

Western and non-Western academics agreed that salaﬁsm and
Islamism were transforming political and religious discourse
even though local governments successfully had fended off
the establishment of more formal Islamic governments in
place of nation-states.
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•

Strategic and security studies have not truly internationalized.
Western experts frequently have not been interested in, nor
exposed themselves to the ideas of, their Middle Eastern or
Muslim counterparts. As in any professional specialization, it
seems more important to quote insiders to the policymaking
world. Sometimes strong xenophobia results (as strong as
anti-Americanism on the other side of the world); we hear
“foreigners” blamed for an inefﬁcient control over “their
terrorists” that culminated in 9/11. Most often, though,
specialists simply lack access to non-Anglophones and their
ideas, which would be useful if, in fact, we hope to address
the ideology of Islamist extremists.

•

By the same token, in recommendations made in the
policymaking community and DoD, ideas from Islamic
ideology elicit great interest, but taken piecemeal and
poorly understood, create a terrible goulash of ideas about
the information war, a bewildering confusion of cultural,
psychological, and political interpretations. One reason is that
in following a directive to integrate more “cultural” awareness,
“culture” is primarily deﬁned as behavior, but sometimes,
as ethnic, or historical, political, or sociological information,
as well as religious concepts that are obtuse to outsiders.
Another reason for this confusion is the understandable desire
for the greatest possible amount of information to feed into
data banks, but there is no sound plan for integration of that
information into action-proposals, and no capacity to analyze
potential negative effects of such proposals. For example, many
suggestions have been made that Muslims must develop, or
be taught (presumably by Westerners) a new kind of jihad.
Some discuss ways to convert or secularize Muslims and
whether or not a moderate form of Islam (not Islamism) exists.
Notions that all Muslims would be attracted to a Caliphate, or
that this is even a primary concern for Muslims, are similarly
off target.

Understandable confusion about the nature and deﬁnitions of
jihad come from modernist interpretations, mostly developed in the
19th and early 20th centuries of the so-called “greater” and “lesser”
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jihad as is explained later on in this monograph. Americans then
suggest that if Muslims actually teach that the greater jihad consists
of striving for Islam in the sense of being a good Muslim, why can’t
they engage in that instead of ﬁghting nonbelievers? This division
is useful in a summary version of Islam as presented in an interfaith
dialogue, or to explain to outsiders why jihad can mean more than
“holy war.” However, it is, at heart, a modernist interpretation that has
not been acceptable to many Muslims, and the notion of substitution
of “greater” for “lesser” is not expressed in the classical treatises on
jihad. Jim Guirard of TruthSpeak deﬁnes himself as an anti-al-Qaeda
language warrior, arguing that writers should substitute criminal
for the word “jihad” (like some Muslim governments) or, instead,
substitute hiraba. Muslims have also discussed hiraba as a term that
could describe acts of terrorism against the civilian public,25 but
there are theological, philosophical, and legal problems with these
suggestions that Muslims should not identify terrorist actions with
jihad. “Hiraba” is a criminal category that is detailed in the Qur’an
in “Al-Ma’idah, Surah V,” following the story of Adam’s two sons,
Habil (Abel) and Qabil (Cain). Then after a verse (32) that is usually
interpreted to refer to Israel’s rebellion against Allah, the punishment
is described for a hiraba crime that combines sedition, apostasy,
and brigandry.26 Hiraba is usually used to mean a crime that causes
public disruption and involves theft of money or property, rape,
or destruction of agriculture or animals. Jihad on the other hand, is
ﬁghting on the path of Allah.
The events of 9/11 were not the ﬁrst surprise attack by extremist
Muslims that caught experts short, and will not be the last. A similar
moment of existential shock took place when Ayatollah Khomeini
returned to Iran in 1979, and a barrage of hastily written literature
about the Islamic threat, the failures of political development, and
the future of political Islam was produced. In that case, the primary
event was the fall of an ally, the Shah, and his replacement with a
hostile theocracy. The Iranian revolution was a true revolution in
the sense of a complete shift in the political order. Some have tried
to diminish the role that Islamist ideology played in these events
by pointing out that the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) did not
defeat its more secular or socialist enemies immediately, but the
fact remains that the revolution responded to Islamist ideology and
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organization. The secondary event, the seizure of American hostages,
was more obviously a “terrorist” event. Analysts then documented
the rise and spread of Islamist movements in Tunisia, Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf states; revived earlier analyses of the
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) founded in Egypt, or
examined brief outbursts of violence such as the 1979 takeover of
the Grand Mosque in Mecca. While few Islamic revolutions followed
Iran’s (other than the coup in Sudan and the Taliban victory in
Afghanistan, and an electoral shift in Turkey with the victory of the
Refah [Welfare] party), Islamization and a new Islamic discourse
have swept through the region.
The New Islamic Discourse.
Islamist discourse replaced or transformed Arab socialist or
other Muslim-leftist values of mid-century all over the region, even
in Syria, which supposedly had extinguished its Islamic movement
with the massacre in Hama in February of 1982. Was Syria’s
repressive strategy successful? Despite the dominance of the mass
Ba`thi party system, any urban resident of Syria in the 1990s could
identify Islamist groups operating quietly. But more importantly,
Islamist groups have used Syria to plan and stage attacks elsewhere,
and insurgents in Iraq have derived support and ﬁnancial aid there.27
The Syrian government reported clashes with Tanzim Jund alSham lil-Jihad wa-al-Tawhid (Organization of the Army of Greater
Syria for Jihad and Unicity) in Damascus.28 On the one hand, this
demonstrates governmental efforts to control radicals, but also that
they have indeed reemerged from, or despite the destruction of, the
earlier Islamist uprising in Syria.
Islamist discourse responds to an internal debate in the region
expressed as a battle raging between `asala (authenticity, but not
necessarily traditionalism) and mu`asara (modernity). The tenets
of each vary according to the country and decade in question,
but to summarize, local intellectuals hoped to retain the positive
aspects of cultural authenticity but rid themselves of archaisms and
backwardness. They worried about features of modernization that
they could not control such as the breakdown of the extended family

19

system, increasing income gaps, or partial or wholesale adoption of
Western fads or habits that were at odds with local values. Thinkers
engage today in this debate in the context of an era of privatization
and more economic vulnerability to the world economy than under
protective state economies of the past. They want to stave off a Big
Mac/MTV/music and dance video culture, embraced by younger
sectors of the population. They predict the breakdown of the
family system now that many women have entered the workforce
and obtained greater independence. Many moderates and Islamist
extremists share the anti-materialist features of these ideas and
other aspects of reformism, reinterpreting and renovating Islamic
traditions and ideas.
But politics—international, regional and local—predicated
responses to Islamists from power elites in the various countries
affected. Extremists, moderates who are by no means secularists,
and conservatives outnumber liberals. And liberals—even those
dubbed Arab democrats—have problems with the questions of
Islamic identity, or the great divide between their views and those of
the sha`b (ordinary citizens) as we have seen in Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Egypt. Islamists have made tremendous gains whether through
the weak democratization policies of Jordan or the Gulf, or where
secular political movements faltered, as, for example, in the West
Bank town of Qalqilliya. Qalqilliya was once a stronghold of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, one of the four parties
of the PLO. Today the town is pro-Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ).
Extremist leaders gain strength from elements of a new Islamic
discourse, and they also contribute to it. At the most basic level, that
is because their efforts to live more “Islamically” are in tandem with
the aims of many other Muslims today, even though their efforts to
swiftly revolutionize the social and political environment by violent
means set them apart. The blurriness of this distinction is ignored
somewhat by the policymaking and intelligence communities which
have attempted to separate the “good Islam” from the “bad”—the
extremists. One strategy (U.S. and foreign) has been to dub Islamist
moderates with the “good” label, so long as these groups avoid or
have forsworn violence. At the same time, they actually pathologize
extremism without noting the relevance of certain themes in the
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strategies and tactics of the hundreds of Osamas now emerging to
the broader Muslim awakening. This, along with negative reactions
to foreign interventionism, cause some Muslims to sympathize with
a bin Ladin, or a Zawahiri, or more often, simply fail to see them as
“enemies.”
Part of the new Islamic discourse is devoted to the new jihad. The
separation of personal striving to be a better Muslim, the so-called
greater jihad, is stated in it, along with the re-energized necessity
of the lesser jihad, or ﬁghting. The new Islamist discourse calls for
implementation of shari`a, Islamic law, the enhancement of Islamic
morality and ethics, reinterpretation of Islamic texts, pursuit of
da`wa, Islamic mission, and also, to various degrees, the Islamization
of existing political systems. It opposes Darwin’s theory of evolution,
and upholds complementarity of the sexes rather than symmetrical
equality, and insists on Islamic modest dress for women. It may
include ideas identiﬁed as Suﬁ in nature, such as the progressive
stages of personal spiritual advancement, the utility of brotherhood
and guidance (suhba, the spiritual companionship of the group—an
experience provided by Islamist radical associations as well). Or it
may counter Suﬁ precepts by emphasizing training and guidance
(tarbiyya) versus enlightenment, and social responsibility rather than
the highly individual pursuit of unity with God.
The new Islamist discourse can, and sometimes does, include
the salaﬁst ideal of purifying the faith from the effects of cultural
synthesis, or “un-Islamic” innovations, but sometimes also
incorporates suspect textual interpretations, for example, in the
use of hadith (a secondary source for Islamic jurisprudence). Not
all Islamists are salaﬁs, another frequently misunderstood term in
the current lexicon of U.S. policymakers. The word really means
“purists”—those returning to the spirit of the early generation of
Muslims, and today’s salaﬁs are more and less than this term implies;
also, not all salaﬁs are engaged in violence.
European scholars had promoted the notion of post-Islamism—a
term that, like post-modernity, posits a temporal and philosophical
space where ideas have run dry or failed to realize their goal—in this
case, an Islamic state. But 9/11 illustrated the ferocity of a group of
individuals who do not believe that liberal democracy is the “end of
history.”
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Writing within the new Islamist discourse are others more
inclusive in their perspectives. For example, Iranian `Abd al-Karim
Soroush,29 a 60-year-old philosopher who is part of Iran’s prodemocracy movement and has challenged some of Khomeini’s ideas,
considers the role of Islam beyond the Islamic revolution. Some
emerge from anti-Islamist political systems, like Muhammad Sa`id
Ramadan al-Buti of Syria who criticizes Wahhabism.30 Then, there
is Moroccan Islamist `Abd al-Salam Yasin,31 who promotes aspects
of mysticism. One could point to leaders of the well-established
Muslim Brotherhood, such as the articulate `Isam al-`Aryan (Essam
al-Eryan) of Egypt,32 or the Wasatiyun, a moderate party that broke
away from the Brotherhood and has counterparts in Jordan, Kuwait,
and elsewhere. On the popular, as well as the intellectual, level,
Islamist discourse has been attracting a broad audience.
Take, for instance, the nonintellectual popularity of Egyptian
televangelist `Amr Khaled, who calls his mission the appeal of the
heart. Khaled markets a new Islam to the younger generation. He is
the antithesis of a turbaned, robed cleric, appearing in natty business
suits, and discussing issues relevant to his younger audience
members. One of his slogans available on T-shirts is “I am a Maker
not a Taker,” and his goal is an Islamic renaissance (nahda). He
promotes a 12-step program towards Islam in his show, Lifemakers
(Sunna` al-Hayat). So seductive was Khaled that he was dubbed a
Rasputin and banned from preaching in Egypt in 2002. He moved
back and forth from the UK to Lebanon, and back to the UK,33 and
his fans now comprise other Arabs and immigrants to Europe as
well as Egyptians.
Even Muslim modernists now express Islamism, or what some
call neo-salaﬁsm, an updated, or more intense version of Sunni purist
thought with political and religious aims. Some are more tolerant or
critical than others. Fahmi Huwaydi, a journalist and Muslim thinker
promotes pluralism and opposes the extremists because they do not.34
My point is that Muslims have new spokespersons, or heroes—and
they are not necessarily scripturalist, or salaﬁ, like the frequently
described “fathers” of modern Islamism, Abu al-`Ala al-Mawdudi,
Hasan al-Banna, or Sayyid Qutb or, on the Shi`a side, reinvigorated
Ja`afari Islamists like Khomeini or `Ali Shari`ati. But neither are they
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secularists. To be a secularist today is to be considered religiously
delinquent, and one cannot be an atheist or an agnostic in Muslim
society as is quite possible in the West. The Arab and Muslim media
therefore speak of liberals rather than secularists.
If the United States continues to promote secularism, in one
form or another as the antidote to extremist or revivalist Islam, it
will not reach hearts and minds. These new ﬁgures are calling for
reinvigoration of Islam and its application throughout life through an
activist agenda. They will not sit still while their governments order
the construction of Western-style democracies (though democratization may grant them a new political role, they do not want a replication
of Western features of democracy or the implementation of secularist
aims). Both they and the extremists aim at establishment of a New
Ummah (community of Muslims); the latter, however, believe that
only jihad and the overthrowing of impious political leaders will
prove effective in that aim.
ISLAMIST APPEAL
Extremist recruitment successes are due to forces that ideologically attract or repel—factors that push the public away from other
political movements or the state, and qualities that attract them
to Islamist extremists. President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union
address and March 2005 speech on terrorism indicated that despair
and tyranny are factors impelling ordinary Muslims toward such
movements and away from other allegiances, and so democratization
is called for.35
While this transformational sentiment is an admirable, if unusual,
addition to U.S. foreign and national security policy, it might be
more accurate to assent that despair and tyranny are recipes for
many different types of disastrous situations. Yet, they are not the
sole, or even the major, reasons impelling Muslims toward extremist
Islamism. Despair can emerge from economic distress, but also from
immobility, impotence in the face of state violence, lack of access
or wasta (inﬂuence, mediation, an intermediary who can intervene
for one), disgust with corrupt local leadership, impermeable elites,
or state systems. It is true that Islamist groups have been sensitive
to socioeconomic needs of their target populations and use these
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to their advantage—for instance in the Ikhwan’s response to the
1992 earthquakes in Cairo, assistance of $1000 to every homeless
family.36 Such efforts parallel a broader rise of Islamically-oriented
volunteerism in Egypt, and not all organizations are linked to any
politically active group.37 Or one could note Hizbullah’s provision
of electricity in Beirut in the early 1990s, hospitals there and in
Ba`lbak, and private schools. Marriages are extremely expensive for
populations with low wages; it is estimated that it takes 10 years for a
man in Egypt to save for his wedding and all the related costs. Islamist
groups around the region have met this social challenge actively by
hosting group weddings and footing many of the expenses, such as
in a recent wedding Hamas sponsored for 452 couples.38
The Palestinian party, Hamas, and the Lebanese Hizbullah
recently have seen higher recruitment in the Palestinian territories
as a result of their response to the scandals concerning the collection
of prisoners’ pensions. Even after the two token releases of political
prisoners, some 8,000 Palestinians remain incarcerated, and their
families depend on small pensions of about $150 per month. Their
female relatives have been harassed, or worse, when they try to
collect these pensions, so these Islamist organizations intervened
to provide assistance.39 Islamists, particularly moderate and wellorganized groups like Hamas, are expected to do well at the polls
in the West Bank. In Gaza, on the other hand, they resisted the
Palestinian Authority (PA)’s efforts to exclude them from gains after
the disengagement of August 14, 2005. The overall security situation
has been plagued with inﬁghting. The PA was unable and apparently
unwilling to control the thuggish behavior (assaults, shakedowns,
harassment) by some of the al-Aqsa Brigades, yet, to show its tough
side, has imprisoned and even tortured Brigade members in Jericho.40
The future of the Brigades is uncertain; they may be absorbed into
the PA security structure, but the PA is trying to isolate and destroy
their more able leaders, while inciting and manipulating some of
the above-mentioned thuggery. That causes more distrust of the PA,
and siding with dependable or morally compelling organizations as
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah are perceived to be.
Israeli strategies against these groups have ranged from
“targeted elimination,” or assassinations to put pressure on the PA
to rein them in, or their receiving no further concessions toward
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peace or withdrawal. In general, insistence on security before peace
seems both impractical and to be dividing the Israeli and Palestinian
populations among themselves, causing despair on the part of propeace individuals on each side of the Wall.41 This may imply that
security might not be achievable in Iraq, and that a state of low-level
battle with insurgents is likely to continue for some time.
The Israelis exiled members of Hamas, but that caused further
radicalization. Hamas exiles in Lebanon were a public relations
problem for the Israelis, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad already has
shown its ability to operate from a Damascus base. Israelis also
launched informational campaigns about the violence preached by
Muslims which, in light of the overall discrimination against Arabs
and Muslims in the country, only translated into greater Israeli
distrust, yet little transformation of discourse. Israeli authorities
closed Hamas’ charities, and the basic effect was that support was
withdrawn from the most miserable sectors of the camp-dwelling
Palestinians.42 Heightening public distress has not decreased the
Islamist groups’ popularity, and there may be other ways that it has
channeled assistance and funds.
In Egypt, at least two new radical cells emerged in the fall of
2004 and the spring of 2005.43 Meanwhile, the government’s violent
and coercive responses to an indigenous democracy movement, as
well as Muslim Brotherhood protests in May 2005, might encourage
people to join one of the forms of political opposition available to
them—liberal, Islamist, or extremist. Stringent counterterrorist
measures that involve detention and torture, and which have been
employed in Egypt, play a role in radicalizing those already involved
in extremist movements. These measures cause the government to
be viewed just as the extremists depict them; as anti-Islamic, those
who suppress sincere Muslims.
Former Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda, an Iranian-American
who grew up in the Arab world and remembered Islamist activists
from his youth in Syria, characterizes militant Islamism as being
“essentially a political movement, not a religious one,” that
nonetheless will threaten the West and be “lethal to the Muslim
world.”44 The problem is that other Muslims see Islamist insurgents
quite differently, because religion and religious discourse can
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encompass political, social, and economic goals. Tony Blair, Francis
Fukuyama, and others have made the same point—that extremists are
not operating on a religious basis. That betrays a misunderstanding
of Muslims’ holistic view of life; everything is religion, everything
is Islam; ﬁnancial, social, intellectual, theological, military, and
political.
The basic principle, “Islam is religion and state” (Islam, din wa
dawla), has been constrained by nation-states for some time. Also,
Muslims generally are concerned with whether or not a person,
action, or substance is Islamic, categorizing each as “allowed,”
“forbidden,” or “neutral.” Which looks more Islamic: a party that
aids prisoners’ families, or secularist party ofﬁcials who are known
to torture young militia members and siphon off party funds? Which
looks more Islamic: radicals who claim that they will restore a Muslim
way of life to Egypt’s rapidly changing environment, or government
ofﬁcials also associated with corruption and torture? Liberals, such
as the followers of the Kifaya (Enough) democracy movement in
Egypt, do not favor a religious state. Factions which support the PA,
or at least accept its leadership more thoroughly than they support
Islamist parties in Palestine are also pro-secular. But both are very
small groups. The larger segments of these populations so fervently
accept the principle of an Islamic state that any effort to distinguish
between “religious” and “political” is fraught with difﬁculties. Such
distinctions aren’t a useful way to delegitimize Islamists, or extremist
Islamists.
ISLAMIST STRATEGIES
Martin Kramer, an Israeli-based authority on Middle Eastern
politics, claimed that radical Islamists had an Achilles heel—their
inability to cooperate with other actors.45 This general statement,
made in the 1990s, is no longer accurate, if it ever was. Moderates, as
well as extremists, formed useful alliances for themselves in Egypt,
Lebanon, and now in Iraq. We could say that is due to the ﬂexibility
of their grand strategy (destroy, then rebuild a New Umma by
whatever means are necessary). Speciﬁc factors of their historical
experience, responses to local repression, forged their ﬂexibility.
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When Egyptian Islamists faced trial in that country, many ﬂed,
recruiting others to the jihad in Afghanistan and later Chechnya.
They traversed various temporary sanctuaries: Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, or through the Western desert to Libya. The Saudi Arabian
government argued its inability to contain Osama bin Ladin, though
it stripped him of his citizenship. He traveled to the Sudan where
he could continue to build his organization. All of the above helps
explain networking, alliances of convenience, and franchising.
It also explains the futility of exiling extremists, as the Israelis
tried with PIJ and Hamas. If Islamists lose ground in Iraq, some will
melt back into society, and others will move on to Saudi Arabia, or
Syria, or return to Egypt, the Sudan, and other points. Some already
have tried moving back into Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states. Iraq
has been the most important training ground to date for such ﬁghters;
their proﬁciency has increased there, although their numbers do not
equal those of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. In other words,
jihad leads only to more jihad.
Islamist leaders employ various strategies that enhance their
ideological impact and transmit it to potential recruits. Some are the
natural consequence of their worldview, shaped by various inﬂuences
from their milieu, for example, the inclusion of various themes of
Third Worldist ideology or Leninist notions about the development
of the vanguard which provides a good ﬁt for small groups with
international aims. Their history of opposition also affected their
tactics and strategies. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
of Egypt created a secret apparatus (tanzim sirri) in the 1940s that
carried out violent actions, including assassinations, because they
were blocked from political advancement in other ways.46 Despite
the MB’s evolution of a different strategy, creating a mass-base
through education and gradual change, its secret apparatus served
as a model for the radical Islamist groups emerging after the 1967
war.
Tactical decisions such as the selection of particular targets in
preference to others, or the forging of alliances with groups not
necessarily identical to the al-Qa’ida model, heighten groups’
malleability and abilities to survive. Thanks to movement,
reconstitution, franchising, and the ﬂexible aspects of their grand
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strategy, extremists replace themselves and beneﬁt from the various
alliances available to them. New Islamist-extremist leaders have
been quite successful in constructing and defending their ideological
authenticity. They have altered and elaborated certain themes,
elevating their programs to a new level of sophistication. This
strategic success is something of a paradox because these leaders of
the next generation claim to be defending the “true jihad” which is,
as are most ideas, a constantly evolving construction.
METAMORPHOSIS OF ISLAMIST LEADERS
Osama bin Ladin, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, and other
contemporary ﬁgures can be seen as reincarnations or avatars of
earlier leaders of the 1970s and 1980s like Juhayman al- `Utaybi,
Salah Siriyya, Shukri Mustafa, Muhammad abd al-Salam Farag, and
Shaykh `Abdullah `Azzam. That means that the public and potential
recruits identify with themes that have remained constant in these
leaders’ messages—for example, the corruption of the current
political order in the Muslim world. Yet they have contributed other
newer themes to the discourse of jihad.
What may be learned from the experiences of earlier Islamist
extremists? Salah Siriyya, a Palestinian agronomist who was an
adherent of the Islamic Liberation Party originally established by
Shaykh Nabahani in Palestine, inﬁltrated the Technical Military
Academy in Egypt. His followers tried and failed to kill President
Anwar Sadat there in 1974. His group’s effort was mirrored in a later
successful assassination operation carried out by the Tanzim Jihad.
Both attacks involved members of the Egyptian military, which has
provided Egypt’s political leadership ever since the dissolution of the
monarchy with the 1952 revolution of the Free Ofﬁcers. Moreover,
both parties continued to operate—the mother Islamic Liberation
Party that spawned Siriyya’s Military Academy Group has gained
strength in other areas ranging from Uzbekistan to London, where
it could freely promote its aim of a caliphate and the cessation of the
system of nation-states.47
Shukri Mustafa, another charismatic personality, led his
followers in the Egyptian group, Takﬁr wa-l-Higrah, underground,
describing their ﬂight, or higrah, from jahiliyya (barbarism like that in
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the pre-Islamic era) as a necessary stage in jihad akin to the Prophet
Muhammad’s (s.a.w.s.48) journey from Mecca. In 1977, they attacked
Egypt’s ﬂeshpots, nightclubs along Shari`a al-Haram, a playground
for Arab tourists, and a few months later kidnapped the moderate,
Muhammad adh-Dhahabi, a former Minister of Awqaf (Islamic
Endowments), and held him for ransom. More than 400 members
were arrested, and Mustafa was executed. He had broadened the
scope of action for future radicals by challenging the Islamic nature
of Egyptian society,49 targeting an exemplar of moderate Islam, and
legitimating such attacks on agents of the state.
Juhayman al-`Utaybi, grandson of an Ikhwan warrior, challenged
the guardianship of the Saudi royal family over Islam’s holy cities,
Mecca and Medina—and by extension, their leadership in the Islamic
world—when he took over the Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1979. The
Saudis were in an even more uncomfortable position than Americans
in Iraq who must respond to shelling from mosques, because there
were many hostages taken, and a lengthy stand-off was only resolved
with the aid of foreign forces. Al-`Utaybi actually did not claim
leadership of his own movement but instead presented his followers
with an historically-sanctioned leader, a mahdi—a guided one—his
brother-in-law, al-Qahtani. In doing so, he provided a linkage to the
rationale of Islamic purist movements of the past.50
Muhammad `abd al-Salam Farag, ideologue of the Egyptian
Tanzim al-Gihad Islami (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) whose operative
Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambuli assassinated President Anwar Sadat
in 1981, emphasized jihad as well, claiming that it was a sixth pillar
of Islam, and the only acceptable means of its expression is armed
struggle. Jihad cannot be avoided; it is an incumbent individual
obligation like fasting during Ramadan. He employed a Trotskyesque
concept (ironically similar to the notion of continuous revolution
employed by the Ba`th Party both in Syria and Iraq), writing of a
“continuous” or “perpetual struggle,” a never-ending jihad.51 He
wrote that Muslims should wage jihad against the governments of
all the modern Muslim states because their laws were created by
inﬁdels. Muslims should not work for, nor cooperate with, such
governments nor join their armies.52
Shaykh `Abdullah `Azzam, who taught Osama bin Ladin,
originally came from a Palestinian village near Jenin, moved around
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the Middle East from Jordan to Syria where he graduated from
the University of Damascus, went from there to Egypt where he
attended al-Azhar University, to Saudi Arabia, and from there to
Pakistan. He inspired disciples with his strong personality and an
uncompromising message. In one of his key tracts, he explains:
When a span of Muslim land is occupied, Jihad becomes individually
obligatory (fard `ain) on the inhabitants of that piece of land. The woman
may go out, without her husband’s permission, with a mahram, the one
in debt without the permission of the one he owes, the child without
his father’s permission. If the inhabitants of that area are not sufﬁcient
in number, fall short, or are [too] lazy [to wage jihad], the individually
obligatory nature of jihad extends to those around them, and so on and
so on until it covers the entire earth, being individually obligatory (fard
`ayn) just like prayer, fasting, and the like so that nobody may abandon
it.
The obligation of Jihad today remains fard `ayn (an individual obligation
of a believer) until the liberation of the last piece of land which was in the
hands of Muslims but has been occupied by the disbelievers.53

Foreign occupation or military presence on Muslim lands then
becomes the most powerful argument for jihad, and one hinging on
American foreign policy in the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Azzam’s deﬁnition and prioritization of jihad is echoed by many other
“Osamas,” such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who said from his Jakarta
prison cell that martyrdom actions for jihad cannot be postponed for
any reason, not even to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, or to visit sick
parents—it “must be number one.”54
Azzam bolstered the new jihad through his mobilization efforts
and, additionally, through his insistence that jihadists should confront
the Western enemy and use Muslims in the West with all of their
global connections. This encouragement to ﬁght the far enemy has a
direct relationship to the 9/11 attacks and to attacks on Westerners
in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Spain, the Philippines, and London. But it
should be understood that up to that point, jihadists were, and may
still be, pragmatic. It is not that they eschewed attacks on the “far
enemy,” since their analysis pinpointed the U.S. role in supporting
the local governments that were battling or containing Islamists. The
issue was simply a gauging of response. What kind of a response
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would a direct attack on Americans engender? If groups aimed at
local sovereignty, it made little sense to elicit an American response,
for example, to attacks on American tourists. What changed in those
like `Azzam was the conviction that a heightened jihad must take
precedence, and direct attacks would intensify the conﬂict between
the West and Islam, illustrating the inevitability of jihad and
martyrdom both to mujahidin, and other Muslims who might join
them instead of moderate groups calling for reform.55
Just as al-Qa’ida capitalized on the new elements of jihad supplied
by these leaders, current recruiters and leaders are amplifying
them. Take, for instance, the leaders and operation planners for
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). PIJ believes that Israel must be
destroyed through jihad and that its own role in such a war is as a
revolutionary vanguard.56 PIJ has utilized its resources judiciously,
limiting the numbers of attacks mounted against Israelis, and these
are generally effective. It recently rejected participation in a unity
front proposed by President Mahmoud Abbas, as did Hamas and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.57 These three
groups contested the PA’s insistence that it provide sole security
in Gaza after Israeli withdrawal in August. Meanwhile, the Israelis
announced that they intend to resume targeted “eliminations,” i.e.,
assassinations of PIJ ﬁgures.58
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah of the PIJ—who speaks Arabic,
Hebrew, English, and even a little Yiddish—attended university in
Zagazig, Egypt, and the University of Durham in the UK, where he
established good connections with other Arab and Muslim students,
and subsequently appeared in Tampa at a Muslim research institute,
World & Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), established through
the auspices of the University of Florida. Shallah’s doctoral thesis
had focused on Islamic economics, and his efforts to meld political
economy with Islamist thought runs parallel to efforts of earlier
ﬁgures like Muhammad as-Siba’i, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood
in Syria. Shallah, who has a sharp intellect,59 actually wielded some
inﬂuence on the academic discourse about Islamist movements as
the editor of Qira`at Siyasiya (Political Readings), the journal of WISE.
By demonstrating to Arabic readers that American academics, like
Louis Cantori, Richard Bulliet, Bernard Lewis or John Esposito, were
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treating Islamist ideas as manifestations of a broader intellectual
phenomenon and placing their articles in Arabic translation alongside
Islamist writings or interviews (with ﬁgures like Hasan Turabi, the
Sudanese Islamist leader), the image of the Islamist movement and
the notion of its inevitability grew. It should be noted that none of
these academic collaborators knew Shallah would later assume the
leadership of Islamic Jihad. So, one could see Shallah as a sleeper
jihadist who tried his hand at inﬂuence via persuasion, prior to his
assumption of leadership in a violent struggle.
Shallah has made claims, repeated by young jihadis, that Israel
will never defeat human bombs, “not even by nuclear bombs,”60
emphasizing the indefatigable thirst for martyrdom, persistence,
and inverse relationship of small operational cost to much larger
effect that characterizes this strategy. Western analysts wrongly have
pointed to suicide operations (jihadis insist these are martyrdom
operations) as a mark of desperation, arguing that groups would
only engage in such efforts when there is no other hope left to them.
In fact, popular songs, children’s games, and public discourse shows
that the linkage of martyrdom to suicide attacks is accepted by many
individuals who see these actions as being “moral.” Jihadists further
claim moral superiority when they say that their willingness to die
expresses a type of commitment that Israelis and Americans lack.
FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO THE WORLD
Osama bin Ladin achieved infamy eclipsing Shallah’s through the
attacks in the United States. He represents both the regionalization
and, if you will, the globalization of the jihad effort. When he identiﬁed
a key Muslim jihadist cause in Afghanistan, he created a regional
nexus for ﬁghters who then articulated goals in all parts of the world.
His own avatars have now emerged, launching themselves into new
arenas. So his capture or demise will not end the jihad. If bin Ladin
is killed, he will remain a martyr, resistance hero, and popular icon
forever, and the United States would do better to put him on trial—
that should ideally be an international cooperative effort—ﬁlming
him periodically in captivity, to diminish his allure, and minimize
his inspiration to future generations of Osamas. This is in no way
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meant to diminish the justice owed to the families of 9/11 and other
victims, but an observation about the process of martyrdom that
needs to be kept in mind.
His distaste for Arab and Muslim governments is due to his
idealistic pursuit of a new ummah, a puriﬁed Muslim society.61 He
is battling for leadership of this society, and al-Qa’ida, as Michael
Scheuer has pointed out, has been able to take advantage of U.S.
ambitions and setbacks in the region to heighten tensions against
the United States and the “apostate” governments.62 Unfortunately
for the United States, many in the Muslim world admired bin Ladin
and saw him as a sort of Robin Hood, rather than demonizing him. A
recent survey shows that, although support for “Islamic extremism”
generally has decreased, some in the region continue to admire bin
Ladin.63 He stood for the defense of the Muslim world through jihad,
creating a central cause and gathering place for mujahidin.
Now isolated somewhere in Pakistan or in rural Afghanistan,
does he continue to attract adherents? The answer is that through his
connections and ﬁnancial wherewithal, and al-Qa’ida’s ideological
inﬂuence over other groups, he exerts inﬂuence over other extremistIslamist groups without necessarily making decisions for them. He
and other key members of al-Qa’ida use familiar arguments—that
local governments were oppressive and corrupt; anti-Islamic, or that
they suppress true Muslims. And they argue that the most holy sites
of Islam in Saudi Arabia are corrupted by the West and the Saudi
royal family. Iraq, with its holy cities, is now occupied as well, and
the holy sites in Jerusalem were seized by Israel, ally of the West, in
1967.
In the leadership of al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula, (QAP,
al-Qa’ida ﬁ Jazirat al-`Arabiyya) we perceive the methodology of Salah
Siriyya’s underground organization and the cyber-expertise of many
of today’s groups. This group self-franchised to al-Qa’ida, and after
a series of bombings and attempted and successful attacks since May
2003, the Saudi security forces claimed they had crippled QAP and
had nearly eliminated its leadership. QAP nevertheless published its
web-magazine, Sawt al-Jihad, in 2004, and recruitment began anew.
The web publication interviewed the late QAP leader, al-`Awﬁ, who
denied that it was best to go ﬁght in Iraq, rather than Saudi Arabia:
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Your country, the Peninsula, is in greater need of your services. There
are several borderlines here to protect. The enemy that you want to go
to, those who are defaming the honors in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in
Palestine, that enemy is here, amongst you. He is on your land, pillaging
your religion and your treasures. It is the lawful duty of a Muslim to
close the hole that is nearest to him. Clerics have agreed that, if an enemy
occupies one of the Muslim countries, he needs to be pushed away from
the nearest point, then the one after that.64

He also demeaned those neo-salaﬁsts participating in negotiations
with the Saudi government. Since then, many Saudis have traveled
to Iraq to ﬁght. Israeli writer Rueven Paz contends that the largest
portion of foreign ﬁghters in Iraq are Saudis, but Nawaf Obaid, a
Saudi analyst, disagrees.
Saudi security forces contend that their antiterrorism campaign
has diminished public support for the jihadists in their country. This
campaign featured televised meetings in which religious ofﬁcials
spoke against extremism and huge billboards; for example, one in
Riyadh with a depiction of bombing damage, reads poignantly,
“My Country, Did You Do This?”65 In this conservative society, it is
signiﬁcant that a debate about Saudi Arabia’s role in inspiring acts
of terrorism is taking place, though it is amid much discomfort about
the incorrect labeling of Islam and Wahhabism itself.
Saudi ofﬁcials at ﬁrst reported that al-`Awﬁ was killed at alQassim in early April 2005, his body too badly burned to identify.
But jihadi web-postings were scornful of this news, and a Saudi
dissident claimed that the movement’s leader, Sa’ud al-`Utaybi, was
killed then, not al-`Awﬁ,66 who may have taken part in the Jedda
attack. This kind of uncertainty probably bolsters the insurgents. As
this dissident pointed out, a general Saudi sentiment of support for
jihad in Iraq could aid QAP, despite its losses over the last 2 years,
especially if they were to shift their targets to the royal family, an
idea supported by at least one faction within QAP.67 On August 18,
2005, Saudi authorities announced they had identiﬁed al-`Awﬁ as
one of the militants they had killed in a raid on extremist hiding
places in Medina.
U.S. policymakers and analysts have misunderstood the
delineation between those in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere who are
ﬁghting the far and the near enemy. It is important to note an existing
34

overlap and ability to shift from one target to another. They would
be ill-advised to take their eyes off of this group, al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula, merely on the grounds that a small group aimed
at the near enemy will not present a global challenge. Likewise, the
argument that al-Qa’ida or Zarqawi are running out of steam68 is
premature. While Saudis point to the successful elimination of many
QAP leaders, they designated a new set of leaders to be targeted,
and, if ﬁghters return from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, a relatively small
number might be quite dangerous, given the vulnerability of the
country’s oil ﬁelds and of many areas in the larger cities, including
public buildings.
AYMAN ZAWAHIRI AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD
Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose maternal grandfather was Shaykh
Abdelwahhab Azzam, who became a dean at Cairo University
and ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and whose father
was deputy chair of the pharmacology department at Ain Shams
University, also studied medicine and became a member of Islamic
Jihad. Egyptians ﬁnally understood that, if upstanding families like
the Azzams and Zawahiris could produce this militant leader, then
the “enemy is within.”69 He spent 3 years in jail after Sadat’s death,
then left for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, where he met Usama bin
Ladin. His own and the organization’s hijrah (migration) from Egypt
to Afghanistan transformed much of Gihad Islami (as pronounced
in Egypt) into al-Qaida. Al-Zawahiri was not the only member of
the group to achieve importance to al-Qai’da, certainly the late
Muhammad Atta was a key combatant as well. Some claim that
Zawahiri and bin Ladin are too busy ﬂeeing for their lives to be of
any importance in global jihad, and that Islamic Jihad, like al-Qa’ida,
may be on the verge of extinction. Yet the group’s history illustrates
its regenerative capacity, that not many militants are needed to
cause havoc, and factionalized groups can join forces. In this case
(some members came from other organizations such as Shabab
Muhammad), EIJ was actually two different organizations—one
founded by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (Farag, in Egypt), and
the other founded by Muhammad Salim al-Rahal, a student of the
Islamic al-Azhar University.
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When Rahal was expelled from Egypt, Kamal al-Sayyid Habib,
a young economics graduate of Cairo University, became the new
leader. The two groups merged when Habib was introduced to
Faraj by Tariq al-Zumur, whose brother-in law, a major in army
intelligence, was the strategist of the Farag group. Various critics of
extremist Islamists have maintained that, like other revolutionaries,
they lack clear platforms, institutions, or programs, yet EIJ’s structure
and training program was well-developed early on. The group was
headed by a majlis al-shura (literally, council of consultation) with
subcommittees for preparation, prograganda, and ﬁnances. Its goal
was a state with a majlis al-shura and a council of `ulama, similar to
Iran’s—not an amorphous caliphate. The group’s initial plan for an
Islamic revolution mimicked the 1952 revolution in that it proposed
the seizure of the Radio and Television building. Stage one of the
training program included ﬁrst aid, knowledge of topography, vehicle
training, defense, and physical exercises. At stage two, techniques
of attacks and ambushes and securing strategically crucial sites
were introduced, as were proper use of weapons and explosives.
Simulations were carried out in the third stage, supervised by Nabil
al-Maghrabi.70
Islamic Jihad became widely known when Khalid al-Islambuli,
a lieutenant in the Egyptian Army and EIJ member, assassinated
President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981. In fact, EIJ leadership
was not of one mind regarding Khalid Islambuli’s plan to assassinate
Sadat. Abbud al-Zumur felt the organization required more time
before it could lead a popular revolution,71 which was to have
broken out following the assassination. Another later disagreement
concerned the subsequent role of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, the
supposed ideologue of the movement.
Once in court, al-Islambuli stated that he assassinated Sadat
because Islamic law, the shari’a, was not being applied in Egypt
because of the peace treaty with Israel and arrests of religious clerics
without justiﬁcation.72 He and other EIJ members expressed their
opposition to corruption, robbery, embezzlement, and bribery—it
was common knowledge that members of the government were
involved in such activities, and the EIJ held that the Egyptian
government enforced or encouraged the physical display of women
(tabarruj al-nisa’).73
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Many Egypt-watchers as well as analysts saw basic similarities
between all of the Egyptian “jihad groups”—Takﬁr wa-l-Higrah,
the Military Academy group, the Gama`at al-Islamiyya, and Islamic
Jihad—in that they were militant and directly confrontational. They
are enacting a commitment to jihad formulated by Sayyid Qutb
and the notion of jihad as a sixth pillar. The idea that jihad was the
absent, or neglected, requirement of Muslims was most fully iterated
by Muhammad `Abd al-Salam Faraj. Actually, Faraj differentiates
between the various “jihad groups” in his treatise, critiquing Takﬁr
wa-l-Higrah and Gama`at Islamiyya, as well as the modernist
rebuttal provided by then Shaykh al-Azhar, Jad al-Haqq, who wrote
a defense of the government’s authority. Faraj’s main point is that
jihad is obligatory. Fleeing jahillliya society in a hijra as Takﬁr wal-Higrah recommended, instead of taking up jihad, was religiously
improper. But using da`wa (mission, proselytization of the correct
Islam) to create a mass base like Gama`at al-Islamiyya and the Muslim
Brotherhood and postponing jihad was also wrong; he argued that
one cannot substitute “populism for jihad.”74 And furthermore, the
nearest enemy is the Egyptian government, not Israel: only under true
Muslims will Jerusalem be liberated. This last argument essentially
distinguishes the Islamic Jihad from the Muslim Brotherhood as
well. Finally, Faraj’s attack on al-Haqq, who spoke for the Egyptian
government, basically argues that the Sword Verses—those verses
of the Qur’an that explain jihad to be obligatory—have abrogated all
other verses and so jihad is, as bin Ladin and Azzam also claimed,
just like fasting.75 Al-Haqq pointed to the propriety of jihad by the
heart and the tongue, instead of the sword, but more strongly made
the argument that the ruler is not an apostate, because an apostate is
only one who rejects all, not just part, of the shari`ah.76
The Egyptian government’s response was to deny ﬁrst, then
suppress Islamic extremism. Meanwhile many members of EIJ went
to the Gulf, Afghanistan, and later Albania, Kashmir, Chechnya,
and ﬁnally in 1998, Zawahiri joined forces with al-Qa’ida. He was
motivated by the fact that some leaders of al-Gama`at al-Islamiyya
agreed to nonviolence following the Luxor attack on a large number
of tourists, but EIJ, at least Zawahiri’s faction, swore to carry on
jihad.
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Ayman Zawahiri carried Faraj’s ideas further in his own book,
Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, which was serialized in the popular
Arabic newspaper, al-Sharq al-Awsat. Here he portrays himself as an
educator to Muslim youth. He is spreading jihad successfully, and
the proof may be found with thousands of young men in prisons
who have become Islamists there. He recommends a “by any
means necessary” strategy, pointing to the damage that even small
numbers can exact and suggests targetting the UN, multinational
corporations, the media, and international relief groups because
these are covers for other operations, according to him, as well as
rulers of Arab states.77 Further, he and al-Qa’ida have now linked
the Palestinian and Iraqi causes to jihad with the argument that the
occupation of Muslim lands requires jihad. In an August 4 videotape,
Zawahiri drew a parallel between Iraq and Vietnam, and threatened
the British and Americans with more violence, saying that if they
[their governments] did not cease “aggression against Muslims,”
they would “see horror that will make you forget what you saw in
Vietnam.”78
Stringent counterterrorist measures apparently backﬁred in
Egypt.79 Torture, hostage-taking, and abuse of Islamist family
members, including sexual abuse, has been documented.80 This
was an important lesson. Still, the Muslim Brotherhood and other
moderates hope to overcome obstacles to political participation and
could continue to provide an Islamist alternative to extremism.
MUHAMMAD MAKKAWI OR SAYF AL-ADEL
Some experts say that Muhammad Makkawi, a colonel in the
Egyptian special forces who became an Afghan Arab, was the
victim of al-Qa’ida inﬁghting.81 But most believe that Sayf al-Adel is
Makkawi’s nom de guerre, and that he has headed al-Qa’ida’s military
wing, providing much of its strategic thinking. Whether al-Adel or
Makkawi, he is a major strategist for the group. He describes alQa’ida’s aims as going beyond Afghanistan, where they supposedly
“sacriﬁced” the Taliban, moved from Iran into Iraq (as Zarqawi, in
fact, did),82 and will also engage the United States in other areas;
he speciﬁes Syria, and Lebanon, as well as Iran, suggesting that
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the United States may attack Iran. Al-Adel credits al-Qa’ida with
foreknowledge of U.S. attacks, and planning capabilities that may
aggrandize the truth.83 In this way, al-Qa’ida is able to adapt to
changing circumstances, taking responsibility for actions planned by
independent cells, or adapting their own plans as in the videotape
that announced that Usama bin Ladin would proceed to Iraq to
strengthen his amir’s, al-Zarqawi’s struggle there.
THE ROLE OF THE SPIRITUAL LEADER:
FROM EGYPT TO INDONESIA
Another strategy fraught with difﬁculties is the identiﬁcation
and punishment of those clerics who inspire or approve acts of
violence. This strategy resembles the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF)
efforts to target political leadership of Islamist groups rather than
their military operatives, because spiritual leaders frequently are
disassociated from actual planning by design, as well as the need to
focus extremist abilities. For example, many Westerners, including
Middle East scholar, Daniel Pipes, blame the inﬂuential Shaykh Yusuf
Qaradawi, Dean of Islamic Studies at the University of Qatar, for
supporting jihad and linking it with martyrdom. Actually, Qaradawi
strongly condemned the 9/11 attacks and all killings of civilians. But
he differentiated these from attacks on Israelis because, he made the
point, there even women are militarized, and he suggests that “acts
of martyrdom” are authorized when a population has no way to
counter occupation.84 His is far from a unique position on this issue;
various Muslim clerics have pointed to the mobilization of the entire
Israeli population, deﬁning them as combatants. The linkage of jihad
to martyrdom in other contexts—assassination attempts in various
countries, operations in Iraq, or in attacks involving other than
civilians—has not been debated sufﬁciently in some places. That said,
bringing “inciters to jihad” to justice violates the customary freedom
of speech enjoyed by spiritual leaders in Islam, which is seen to be
a part of their religious role. Some readers may not understand that
it is considered the duty of the religious preacher to make political
statements and call for action when he believes Islamic rights are
violated. Also, it may not be quite clear that martyrdom and jihad
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are, in fact, topics enmeshed in Islamic history and mentioned in
numerous instances in the Qur’an and other sacred literature. Hence,
a governmental authority cannot forbid a religious preacher to
discuss martyrdom, which has become a populist theme of sorts in a
perceived struggle between the East and the West.
The difﬁculties in pursuing justice for those linked with more
clearly deﬁned terrorist actions, such as Shaykh Umar abd al-Rahman
of Egypt or Abu Bakar Ba`syir of Indonesia, lie also in legal deﬁnitions
of terrorism, culpability, and differences in evidentiary proceedings,
as well as in hostile local reactions to public trials, because it seems
to the public of these Muslim countries that Islam and Islamism,
rather than terrorism, is on trial. This parallels public sentiment that
there is a Global War on Islam (rather than Terror). Extradition, as
of abd al-Rahman, is one response, which affords the West greater
judicial leeway to prosecute. However, `abd al-Rahman’s lawyer, the
well-known Islamist, Muntasir al-Zayyat, who incidentally wrote a
“tell-all” about Zawahiri and then withdrew it from circulation since
Zawahiri could not defend himself, warned that some follower of
the Shaykh might well attack Americans or U.S. interests outside of
Egypt in response to the “humiliation” of the shaykh.85
Abu Bakar Ba`syir or Bashir, originally of East Java, was a
founder of Ponodok Ngruki and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) of Indonesia.
The JI was formed at least in part as a response to the Indonesian
military regime’s attacks on Muslim groups,86 as has the Darul Islam
movement more generally.87 He faced various charges and escaped
to Malaysia. Bas’syir became the JI’s spiritual leader in 1999 when
his co-founder died. Ba`syir was tried in connection with the Bali
bombings and the 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriot hotel. He also
was charged in connection with a foiled assassination attempt on
President Megawati Sakarnoputri. Many Australians were outraged
when, in contrast to the 30-months sentence Ba`syir received for
inspiring a crime in which many of their fellow nationals were killed,
Australian tourist Schappelle Corby was sentenced in May 2005 to
20 years in jail for allegedly bringing four kilos of marijuana into
Bali in her suitcase. Her trial received a good deal of publicity as
well. Further, the Indonesian government had not outlawed JI in the
spring of 2005, although it has imprisoned more than 150 members
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of the organization in the last 3 years, since doing so would give the
impression that the West was dictating to the government.
Much evidence in Ba`syir’s case was eliminated from consideration, including the reports of his attendance of a graduation event
at the terrorist training Camp Hudaybiyya in the Phillipines in 2000,
where he gave a speech promoting jihad. He was cleared of seven
charges and convicted of treason and an immigration violation.
He appealed his 4-year sentence, which was reduced to 18 months,
whereupon he was recharged under Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism
Act, allegedly following U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom
Ridge’s call that “Hopefully in due time . . . he will be brought to
justice in a different way.”88 Haroon Siddiqui commented that
America “advocates democracy but seems to pine for Indonesia’s
old authoritarian ways.” He added, “It needs Muslim moderates, but
alienates them.”89 Ba’syir is no moderate, advocating that the ﬁght
against America “is compulsory,” and that Muslims should attack
Americans in America, and, as bin Ladin urges, that they should free
the Arabian peninsula from occupation.90
Two other instances of clerics’ relevance to the GWOT should
be mentioned. First, Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, a mentor for the
Jordanian and Iraqi group al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, decried attacks
on Muslims in Iraq on al-Jazirah television and in the press, saying
that such attacks “might distort the true jihad.”91 Subsequent web
postings showed that this statement shocked some of his hardline
followers. Many clerics also criticized the London July 7, 2005 (7/7),
bombings; as they did 9/11. But in this instance, some of the clerics
are neo-salaﬁs who support jihad, like Syrian scholar Mustafa ‘abd
al-Mun’im Abu Halimah, who lives in London and is known as
Abu Basir al-Tartusi. After virulent responses to a fatwa, he issued
another statement that basically said that Muslims must operate
with integrity, instead of seeking equivalent degrees of revenge.92
One can see ambiguity in that clerics might provide rationales for
extremists, but not support their actions.
Second, clerics have been useful members of groups for national
dialogue and debate, and in bodies that demilitarize or negotiate
with militants. In any process which seeks to rehabilitate or include
Islamist oppositionist groups, they are critical voices. Judge Hamoud
al-Hitar chaired Yemen’s National Dialogue Committee, established
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in 2002, to conduct dialogue with detainees from groups like alHouthi’s followers, al-Qa’ida, Takﬁr wa-l-Hijra, Afghan veterans,
and the Aden-Abyan Islamic army. By treating the detainees with
respect, but ﬁrmly opposing their ideas, it persuaded some to
relinquish violence. The clerics on the committee formulated their
arguments by drawing on their knowledge of the Qur’an and the
Sunnah (the way of the Prophet). The detainees argued their own
version of jihad, which simply was not well-grounded Islamically, and
not persuasive in the face of superior scripturally-based arguments.93
Dialogue as a means of communicating and providing a way out
of violence also was promoted by Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin
Ibrahim. It was tried as well in Algeria in 1994, but “eradicationists”
and “dialogists” from within the Algerian government and military
clashed, and it took time for the latter method to result in political
normalization.94
ZARQAWI: BANE OF IRAQ
Abu Musab Zarqawi‘s organization’s brutal bombings and
beheadings added a new twist to coercive measures toward local
populations, without which his group, al-Qa’ida ﬁ Bilad al-Raﬁdayn,
QAP, and others could not operate. Zarqawi’s virulent anti-Shi`i
attacks contrast with Osama bin Ladin’s silence on this issue. Bin
Ladin’s salaﬁ followers are also grounded in negative attitudes
toward the Shi`a in general. In Iraq, salaﬁ-jihadist objections to
the Shi`a have much to do with perceived Shi`i cooperation with
American “occupiers.” Zarqawi, whose real name is Ahmad Fadhil
Nazzal al-Khalayla, was born in 1966, a Jordanian from the town of
Zarqa and a member of the Abu al-Hassan tribe. He left school early,
apparently out of frustration when it was recommended that he
attend a vocational rather than an academic high school, and though
formerly a “sinner” who drank, womanized, and sported tattoos, he
became fervently involved in Islamism. Some analysts have tried to
make a case that al-Zarqawi became a jihadi because of poverty or
desperation. In fact, he was not especially poor or miserable, and
many young men are uninterested in vocational or any other form
of education, though others become Islamists or jihadists while
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attending higher education. Al-Zarqawi ﬁrst traveled to Afghanistan
in his early 20s but did not then join bin Ladin’s jihad. After taking
the 13-year-old daughter of one of his associates as a second wife,
he operated a jihadist training camp outside of Herat near the
Iranian border. Experts misattributed and even misidentiﬁed him
at times and some of his contacts, such as Shaykh Abu Muhammad
al-Maqdisi, a key icon to the Jordanian salaﬁsts along with Shaykh
`Umar Abu `Umar, also known as Abu Qatadah.
As with bin Ladin, some rumors circulate that Zarqawi is an
American creation, although when he apparently was wounded in
May 2005, rumors of his death or impending death strengthened
an argument for his existence and mortality. Given the supposed
weakness of his education, some question the eloquence of his
missives. Certain statements have come from other commanders, for
instance, Abu Maysara al-Iraqi who deﬁned al-Qa’ida in Iraq and its
goals in a webposting of Dhurwat Sanam al-Islam, a phrase which
refers to jihad and means Crest of the Summit of Islam. Most political
leaders know the value of a good speechwriter, of course, and dead,
alive, or wounded, Zarqawi is important as a nucleus for Islamic
resistance. Both Zarqawi and Abu Maysara explained that the killing
of Iraqi security forces is licit, even though they are Muslims, because
their cooperation with the inﬁdels renders them apostates or beyond
the pale of Islam. Zarqawi went further in enlisting the enemies of
Islam in Iraq—these being the Shi`a (termed raﬁdhin, or renegades);
Iraqi police and soldiers (because they serve the occupying force);
the `ulama or clerics of Iraq, who he terms Suﬁs and hypocrites; the
Kurds, because of their support of the U.S. occupying force; and,
naturally, the Americans. The Iraqi mujahidin are described as being
courageous but “uneducated and inexperienced,” while ﬁghters
coming from outside Iraq are still “too few in number,” and Iraqis
welcome them [verbally] but won’t allow them to use their homes or
land for bases.95
Zarqawi has been opportunistic in his alliances; for example,
with Abu Abdullah al-Shaﬁ`i of Jund al-Islam; Mullah Kreikar,
originally of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and later identiﬁed
with Ansar al-Islam and its several jihadist offshoots; the Tawhid
group; and Kurdish Hamas. Kreikar allegedly made contact with
Zarqawi through a Jordanian lieutenant and, while this relationship
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goes back to 1997, it seems to have been formalized in 2002 and was
more fully realized in 2003-04.96 Ansar al-Islam’s primary rival was
the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), so, though its goals differ
substantially from al-Qa’ida’s, the alliance brought Afghani-trained
ﬁghters into Iraq. The alliance did not particularly beneﬁt Kreikar
who denied it and was deposed and exiled, although he remains an
Islamist committed to jihad. Ansar al-Sunna was ofﬁcially formed
on September 20, 2003, alongside Ansar al-Islam, and Zarqawi’s
own Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, a force of about 1500 ﬁghters, took shape.
Zarqawi utilized Syrian connections to some degree, dating back to
2002, and information about these was revealed in March 2005.97 The
major beneﬁt of Zarqawi’s later alliance with al-Qaida was jihadic
legitimacy and appeal to salaﬁsts both inside and outside of Iraq.
It should be noted as well that Zarqawi allied himself with
al-Qa’ida, not the reverse, and characterizes himself as resisting
pressure from the United States, in contrast with Ayatollah Sistani
of Iraq, who Zarqawi calls “the leader of inﬁdelity and heresy,” or
Muqtada al-Sadr. Zarqawi accuses the Shi`a of being “the crafty evil
scorpion, the enemy lying in wait with a poisonous bite,” who are
intent on ﬁghting the Sunnis, wreaking vengeance on them after the
fall of Saddam’s Ba`thist regime, and says they want their own state
extending from Lebanon to Iran. He enlists all of their supposed
historical acts of treachery as well, including their “cursing of
Sunnis” and validates his anti-Shi`a views with citations from Imam
Malik Bukhari, Ibn Hazm, and Ibn Taymiyya, (medieval Islamic
sources).98
Zarqawi is not the only Islamist opponent of democracy. In
general, Islamists have objected to democracy because it is described
as a product of Western civilization; in the West, it has supported
secularization and promotes the rights and representations of all
groups in societies. In the Islamist vision, the state should be based
on consultation, shura, but need not be democratic. Certain Islamist
thinkers believe Islam has democratic features, or that shura can serve
the same purpose as democratic representation, but the legal system
in their idealized state is an Islamic one. Non-Muslims are treated
differently under this system and must assent to the will of the
Muslim majority. They might even be subjected to Islamic principles.
Egypt’s Constitutional Court recently ruled that the Islamic practice of
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enforcing the obedience of a wife is incumbent upon a Greek Catholic
woman, and that is under the current legal system.99 Zarqawi, his
group, and others like it fear the democratization of society, not least
because minorities and non-Sunnis will play a role in government
that they would not achieve under Islamist governance.
Zarqawi describes his movement in the language of early Islam
when the Ansar and the Muhajirun (Emigrants from Mecca) united
forces.100 The next stage of early Islamic history featured Uhud
and Badr, key victorious battles for the early Muslims. We need
to understand that to Zarqawi it does not matter how long it takes
to reach the Badr stage, or even if his forces are eliminated in the
process—so he said in his May 2005 tape, “We will either win or die
trying.”101 According to Zarqawi’s thought, even the extinguishing
of his group in battle would heighten jihad, leading to the expansion
of the ummah and the migration and continuation of the jihad to
other places in Iraq and the world.
MUSTAFA SETMARIAM NASAR AKA ABU MUSAB AL-SURI
Abu Musab al-Suri is another of the hundred Osamas. Still in
his teens when Haﬁz al-Asad cracked down on militant Islamists,
he reappeared years later as a key trainer and jihadist idealogue,
backing Zarqawi, and also, allegedly, al-Qa’ida-linked groups in the
West. His real name is Mustafa Abdul-Qadir Mustafa Hussein alSheikh Ahmed al-Mazeek al-Jakiri al-Rifa`i, but his family is referred
to as al-Sitt Maryam. He hails from Aleppo and joined the Tali`a alMuqatila, the Islamist offshoot of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,
charged with violence against Syrian cadets and others. His
background suggests the reemergence of jihadism in Syria, but he
is more properly a member of the global jihad generation. After
1982, he apparently escaped to Afghanistan, joined the mujahidin,
and then surfaced in Spain where he became a part of al-Qaida and
forged connections with Algerian extremists. Later he returned to
Afghanistan and is now working in Iraq, supporting al-Zarqawi as
far as we know. Abd al-Suri is suspected of involvement in the March
11, 2004, Madrid attacks. This charge disturbed him sufﬁciently that
he disclaimed a role in these or the 9/11 attacks in a December 2004
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letter to President Bush. `Abd al-Suri has inﬂuenced many of the
100 Osamas through his book which discusses jihad and jihadist
movements, tactics, fundraising, information warfare, and other
topics.102
FROM IRAQ TO THE WORLD
Experienced and younger leaders and trainers share a deep
commitment to jihad for the forseeable future. This, along with
the migration of jihad from Afghanistan to Iraq, bodes ill for a
counterterrorist policy that focuses primarily on the elimination of
leaders and second tier operatives. Hence, the slayings of Abu Khattab,
Abu Anas al-Shami, Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani, Abu-l-Harith, Abu
Anas al-Turki, Abdel Hadi Daghlas, and Abu Muhammad Hamaza
Hassan Ibrahim, and the capturing of high proﬁle lieutenants like
Abu Qutayba and at least 11 others has not really dampened the
insurgency or thirst for jihad.103 We hope that the Iraqis, who long
for stability and the opportunity to participate in a representative
and democratic political life, will be successful in developing and
enacting other types of counter and antiterrorist campaigns and
policies. Yet, they may have to contend with a lingering or sporadic
insurgency that may be especially troublesome when U.S. troops are
withdrawn.
EXTREMISTS’ STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
Much is made of extremist use of the worldwide web in
attracting recruits and promoting their organizations.104 It is worth
understanding the jihadist effort to communicate the principles of
their successes. First, they have explained that their aim is to embroil
the United States in the region, where it can be fought. That may not
rule out attacks on Western targets, of course, because, as Abu Bakr
Naji’s Idarat al-Tawahhush (The Management of Barbarism) pointed
out, the enemy must be exhausted and its activities disrupted, so it is
important to vary targets and do so “in all parts of the Islamic world
and beyond it.”105 The Western enemy is depicted as huge, unwieldy,
hypocritical, and unjust. The entrapment of this Western Goliath also
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will be accomplished because of ﬂaws or theoretical stultiﬁcation in
Western strategy. As Salim al-Makki (and another strategist) noted,
America today is facing a huge problem with Clausewitz’s theories.
The latter are premised on the existence of a centralized hostile power
with a uniﬁed command. Assuredly, the mujahidin, with the al-Qa’ida
organization in their vanguard, believe in decentralized organizations.
Thus the enemy cannot ascertain the center of gravity, let alone aim a
mortal blow at it. . . . Just a few hundred ﬁghters can “drive crazy the
mightiest, best trained, and best armed armies. With God’s help, this is
happening.”106

We know that U.S. strategists are engaged in debate over the “new
way of war,” and will ﬁnd methods to improve approaches to such
asymmetric threats or the problems of alienating civilians in response
to numerous smaller attacks. And the jihadi “strategy” statement
above may be wishful thinking. Yet, as the Islamists constantly point
out on their PR-oriented websites, their efforts in multiple locations
(along with our own force requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan)
provide many targets, distract from the business of stabilization,
and test public conﬁdence in counterinsurgency in general. This, in
turn, inﬂuences the “will of the people,” whether in the United States
or Iraq, neither of which is a monolithic entity. The extremists also
gleefully point out the multiplication effect—the huge amounts of
money the United States has spent in the GWOT compared to their
relatively modest ﬁnancial investment. New security arrangements,
for instance bag-checking on New York’s subways and airport
security procedures, also cost a great deal. Cameras installed in
the London underground are also expensive and helpful tools in
tracking terrorists, but did not prevent their attacks.
Various web magazines focus on the particularity of groups’
local enemies: the Saudi royal family in Sawt al-Jihad and Muaskar
al-Battal; and the `Alawi regime in Syria for the Risalat al-Mujahidin,
which began publication in 2005. Its home page features a picture
of the Syrian Mazzeh prison, and a fallen sculptured head of late
President Hafez al-Assad which evokes the toppling of Saddam’s
statue. The magazine contains pieces like a call to jihad to “youths
in Levant,” the “criminal history” of the Minister of the Interior, and
one entitled “The Torture of Women in Syria.”107 The anti-Islamic
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nature of governing regimes constitutes a key component of the call
to jihad. Some articles in other magazines, like Sawt al-Jihad, have
justiﬁed and praised attacks on Westerners.
In sum, we may characterize extremist themes, tactical and
strategic, as:
Distract, Annoy, Destroy
Takﬁr (Charging Muslims with Apostasy or Anti-Islamic
Behavior)
Justiﬁcations for the New Jihad
Enmity of Jews and Crusaders (Christians) to Islam
The Failure of Western Strategies and Counterterrorism
David vs. Goliath
Promotion is All
Sow Sectarian Discord (as in Iraq)
Alternative Timeline to Eternity
Internet postings of visual materials promote recruitment,
expand and document Islamist jihadists’ actions, provide details of
encounters with Western forces, and demonstrate the zeal of young
ﬁghters. Zarqawi’s information group posted a video entitled “All
Religion Will Be For Allah” on a Web page with sophisticated
features and many links, enabling the viewer to see suicide bombers
being trained and download a musical tune of the video onto a cell
phone. As with a recruitment tape described below, the graphics and
overall professional quality of the work project another message:
You Can’t Stop Our Information War!
EXTREMISM, EDUCATION, AND INFORMATION WARFARE
Islamic madrasahs frequently are attacked as the source of jihadist
venom. Sometimes people simply assume that Islamic education in
general promotes war on the West, while others have no idea what
curriculum is followed but oppose religious education on principle.
Peter Bergen and Swati Pandev expand on this,
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It is one of the widespread assumptions of the war on terrorism that the
Muslim religious schools known as madrassas, [sic] catering to families
that are often poor, are graduating students who become terrorists. Last
year, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell denounced madrassas in Pakistan
and several other countries as breeding grounds for “fundamentalists
and terrorists.” A year earlier, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
had queried in a leaked memorandum, “Are we capturing, killing, or
deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas
and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against
us?”
While madrassas may breed fundamentalists who have learned to recite
the Koran in Arabic by rote, such schools do not teach the technical or
linguistic skills necessary to be an effective terrorist.108

Further, these authors explained that only about 1 percent of
Pakistanis attended madrasahs, according to information from the
World Bank. In this author’s opinion, although it is correct to associate
the Taliban with unpalatable Islamic ideas, Westerners who call for
the closing of all religious schools are pursuing another misguided
strategy against Islamist terrorism.
Recently, President Musharraf announced the expulsion of
the 1,400 foreign students in Pakistani madrasahs.109 This measure,
along with promises to control extreme speech in the mosques, is
probably a good thing, but it does suggest that the underlying basis
for terrorism is external to Pakistan.
Those who believe that Muslims should eschew or censor Islamic
education need to be aware that private Islamic schools, especially
those that offer sex-segregated facilities and well-developed
curricula, are today more popular than the overcrowded public
school systems operating in many countries. These contrast with the
stereotypical Muslim kuttab or small Quranic elementary program,
and with madrasahs which are essentially Muslim academies. To
keep Islam viable as a holistic lifestyle, Muslims require education
in their religion, its philosophy, and moral values. Dogmatism,
intolerance, and narrow interpretations should be addressed, but
there is probably no more of these problematic attitudes in Islamic
schools than in national schools in certain country cases.
Indeed, national educational systems, for example in Kuwait,
Egypt, and Jordan, contain many Islamists in key positions. Moder49

ates exert a certain effect, and more radical aspects of the curricula,
such as the gloriﬁcation of activist jihad, can be found there as
well. The Kuwaiti government apparently has critiqued anti-Shi`a
sentiments in its curricula, and is very concerned with the way in
which jihad is being promoted, as well.110
Some Westerners mistakenly believe that the lack of modern
education has caused the rise of Islamism and its radical
interpretations.111 Many of today’s Osamas received modern
educations in the sense of a nationally-determined curriculum that
included rational sciences as well as history, language, mathematics
or vocational skills, and ideas that bolster national (rather than
Muslim) identity. Actually, the breakdown of the traditional system
of Islamic education, wherein one was apprenticed to a master,
the `alim (enlightened one), eroded the clerics’ authority. Religion,
as taught in the national curriculum, located authority in any and
every religious product. That made it easier for those with a lesser
intellectual background and Islamist leanings to promote their
views. As Gregory Starrett, a scholar who has looked closely at
the spread of Islamist discourse in Egyptian society, pointed out,
“who the producer is” (and he is very often one of the new Islamist
intellectuals) is “less important than the marketability of what he
has to say.”112 Governments are then trapped into using Islamic
discourse to try to defeat radicals who are more adept than they at
marketing. And at the same time, the general climate of support for
Islamist thought and ideas has grown immensely in the last 25 years
in every Muslim country, even Turkey, once dedicated to Islamic
“secularism.”
Proposed campaigns to secularize Muslims and replace
offensive concepts with others are counterproductive avenues for
information operations and, moreover, smack of ultra-imperialism.
Besides, many efforts were made to secularize and “liberalize”
Muslims earlier in the century that were internally inspired, and
these did not stand up to the Islamic “alternative” or awakening.
As previously mentioned, one Western expert proposed to replace
jihad with mentions of hiraba, another crime usually translated as
brigandry, but which has a separate legal and philosophical history.
Many people call for a Muslim Luther (as if Islam has not had its
own reform movements), and some suggest that reestablishment of
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a Caliphate could aid the West in the GWOT by forcing a centralized
authority on Islam. Muslims are startled to hear spokespersons
such as Irshad Manji, a feminist, lesbian Canadian Muslim, author
of The Trouble With Islam, touted as experts on progressive Islam.
Manji declares she has renounced her faith, which would make her
an apostate in Islamic terms. Though she is not very familiar with
Islamic principles, that does not prevent her from lecturing about the
fundamental contradictions and evils of the faith. This may be why
Muslims now feel that the War on Terror is a cultural onslaught.
Instead, avenues of communication need to be opened and
maintained in forums for debate and discussion in both the Muslim,
non-Anglophone world, and in the West. A proper critique of jihad
can be undertaken, but not on the basis of hype, missionary zeal, or
disdain for the views of others.
FROM EXTREMISM TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Can jihadists be convinced to lay down their arms under any
circumstances? If they do so, should our strategy address them? Some
readers will object here to my use of the label “moderate Islamist”
for organizations like Hizbullah, Hamas, the MB, or the Wasatiyun
(Centrists). But there is no doubt that they are more moderate than
Zarqawi’s organization, for instance. Two other points are important:
they have refrained from attacks on Western civilian targets. No
targeting of the numerous American tours in Israel has occurred to
date, nor did the MB or Wasat ever attack tourists in Egypt. Second,
they have strongly inﬂuenced their co-citizens’ attitudes toward
Islam and moderate Islamism.
Hizbullah of Lebanon, whose founding nucleus came from Iraq,
and Hamas of Palestine appear to be following a similar path. Both
organizations call for Islamic government, but are situated where
compromise is essential. Analysts who examine the World Islamic
Front, or “Caliphists,” are not including Hizbullah and Hamas,
despite various allegations that Hamas members have or had
connections to al-Qa’ida. Similar to Palestinian Islamists, Hizbullah
gained some strength when the reputation of its secular competitor
in the Shi`a community, the AMAL party, was tarnished. Hizbullah
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emerged in a period of chaos and has international and inter-regional
linkages.
Hizbullah illustrates the Iraqization of Shi’ism in Lebanon, as well
as Iranian inﬂuence in its efforts to create a rational and modernist
version of Islamic life.113 Dating back to 1982, its primary raison d’être
was to resist the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, a military
goal, and to represent and uplift the oppressed masses of the Shi`a,
political and socioeconomic goals. The leadership of Hizbullah has
demonstrated various qualities: tenacity, pragmatism, and popular
appeal with its political leader, Hasan Nasrallah, and more erudite
and enlightened interpretations of Islamic principles with Shams
al-Din Fadlallah, an `alim, or religious inspiration of the movement.
Hizbullah faced down factionalism in the Biqa` when one contingent
of the Party led by Shaykh Tufayli rebelled against accommodation
with the Lebanese government after the Lebanese war had ended.
Lebanon has a multireligious political and social base, with 18
ofﬁcially recognized confessional groups. Therefore, Hizbullah’s
aim of an Islamic state where vilayat e-faqih (the rule of the jurist) will
prevail is not practical as a political design for Lebanon as a whole.
But Hizbullah’s competition with other political forces in the Shi`i
community has been quite successful. The Party transformed itself
from a militia/religious movement to a political party/religious
movement with residual militant goals of opposing Israel, arguing,
for instance, that no settlement can be made with Israel, certainly
not without attention to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and in
Syria. Hizbullah is not universally popular with every Lebanese or
even every Shi`a,114 but it is respected and considered less corrupt
than most other political actors and groups.
Shaykh Hasan Yousef, the prominent West Bank Hamas political
branch leader, joined the Muslim Brotherhood while a university
student in Jordan. He used to travel from West Bank village to village
preaching, so he retains great local credibility there, despite lengthy
periods spent in Israeli prisons and exile in Marj al-Zuhur in southern
Lebanon. Hamas has struggled ideologically with the PLO for the
hearts and minds of young Palestinians. It has encountered political
limitations on the part of the PA that returned from Tunis, in particular.
In an interview with the International Crisis Group, Yousef recently

52

stated that “for the ﬁrst time, we feel there is a genuine potential for a
partnership with the PA.”115 And in June, Yousef expressed his desire
to communicate with the West to me, “to establish better relations that
will lead to a better dialogue in the future,” though he was amused
by the title of this monograph, asking me if he was one of my “100
Osamas.” He is strongly troubled by the many key issues that remain
unexplored while the Gaza disengagement proceeds, like the large
number of political prisoners, the ill effects of the new “Wall,” the
misery caused by the closure of Hamas charities (though “Hamas
is willing to be the most transparent of organizations”), and Israeli
efforts to reduce and hem in the Arab presence in East Jerusalem,
while permitting settler establishments and house seizures there.
He hoped that people of conscience could make the United States
and Israel more aware of the contradictions inherent in promoting
Middle Eastern democracy and supporting a system in which every
movement, passage, phone call, and interaction is monitored, and
there is “absolutely no freedom.” Yousef, who was rearrested in
September, pointed to Hamas’ inclusion of women in its political
leadership and list of candidates as well as Christians.116 All in all,
Yousef’s characterization of Hamas goals casts and rationalizes them
as the aims of all Palestinians, so that the organization appears more
nationalist than pan-Muslim, and more pragmatic than idealistic.
RECRUITMENT
Viewing Islamist extremists as strategic leaders can be useful, but
counterinsurgency should focus on two additional levels—operations
experts and recruiters, and potential mujahidin. Some analysts believe
there may be as many as 200,000 insurgents in Iraq, for example. In
fact, the organizational culture of extremist movements still is not
well-understood. Experts have applied a criminological approach,
seeking to identify particular proﬁles for “deviant” behavior. The
new jihad is so widespread and appealing, and the confusion
between general Islamists versus extremists is so profound, that the
criminological or pathological approach is not serving the GWOT
well. For example, the accepted proﬁle—a young, impoverished male
from a rural or recent urban migrant background—no longer ﬁts
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all recruits or volunteers.117 The same fuzziness in proﬁling suicide
attackers should be noted. According to such proﬁles, women were
not supposed to engage in “martyrdom” activities nor were mature
men with families. In fact, women have served as mujahidat since the
early days of Islam, playing an increasingly important role in the last
decade.118 Likewise, a believer is not supposed to take up jihad if he
owes money, and those with dependents were thought less likely to
volunteer; however, men with families have carried out attacks in
Israel, and two of the bombers in the 7/7 London attacks had young
children.
A “successful strategy” is one that brings what an organization
can do (its competencies) into alignment with the needs and demands
of its environment “. . . achieving a ‘strategic ﬁt’.”119 Engaging the
United States in regional hostilities certainly ﬁts the capacities of
many of these relatively small extremist groups more aptly than any
sustained operations in the West. Also, extremist groups have found
suicide attacks to be a successful strategy because they:
•

are force multipliers,

•

attract media attention and increase recruitment,

•

are relatively inexpensive, and

•

are suited to the irregular nature of the organization.

Organizers for martyrs’ cells recruit, indoctrinate, provide materials
and training, and, most importantly, construct a moral contract with
operatives that binds them to the group and their speciﬁc mission.
Sometimes larger entities like a sub-brigade are designated to such
operations as in Zarqawi’s group’s June 20 announcement that it
had formed a unit of “martyrs named al-Ansar” from the Martyr
Brigades of al-Baraa ibn Malik.120
Just as local governments employed both carrot and stick to deal
with their Islamist insurgencies, new Islamist insurgents try to attract
or terrify locals of their bases or neighborhoods. In recruitment, it is
mostly the carrot of jihadi allure; the association of martyrdom and
glory with jihad, along with young people’s strong desire to affect
their environment and general inability to do so along other avenues,
that aids recruitment.
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A video made by Zarqawi’s organization and obtained in Falluja
is a superb recruiting tool that critiques the West, documents and
ritualizes martyrdom, demonstrates the pan-Muslim membership
of the organization, and multiplies its impact. The video features
religious quotations and nontraditional “religious” music, borrowing
from the Eastern/Arab church and Western traditions, that add to
the drama of the tape. In the very ﬁrst segment, American soldiers
kick their way into an Iraqi home and lead away a small child who
calls for her father. This illustrates the reality of Muslims under siege,
when jihad is compulsory for all and obviously necessary in order to
save children and innocents.
Young suicide-attackers from various Arab countries read their
“wills” on the tape to satisfy the cultural and religious instructions to
obtain permission and provide for one’s dependents. Each attacker
appears against the background of a translucent martyr’s stairway,
leading upwards to the light, to Paradise. Martyrs do not require the
ritual washing of other deceased Muslims, but the video shows the
special mourning given them, to give would-be martyrs a taste of
what they anticipate. Muslim intellectuals have spoken and written
about the need to separate martyrdom from these violent acts of
jihad, but there is no mistaking the power of the call to martyrdom
in this tape.
The tape also illustrates subtleties of coercion. Given the cultural
construct of Arab masculinity, what young man would retract his
sworn, video-taped testimony? And Western news footage, maps of
attack areas, actual bombings, and news items are cleverly embedded,
used both as graphics and to demonstrate the power of the group.
These mujahidin cannot explicate their leader’s methodologies,
rather they emotionally identify with components of an organic
philosophy. Jihadi-recruiters must convince these foot-soldiers of the
morality of killing and the utility of dying. Timing is important so that
they will not change their minds or consult others who may report
them or pursuade them against such action. Islamist-extremists also
seek out young people who can be manipulated easily. According
to testimony from captured operatives in Saudi Arabia, some were
coerced into committing crimes so they would not go to the police.
However, recruiters and strategic planners must also build
a continuing force. Here skills, experience, and group cohesion
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are important; and factionalism actually plagues many extremist
organizations, which seek to differentiate themselves from moderate,
or more pragmatic elements.
SWIMMING IN FRIENDLY WATERS
To retain sanctuary, Islamist extremists of all functional levels
also employ two basic strategies—carrot and stick. On the one
hand, they appeal to the young and less powerful because they so
emphatically oppose tyranny, injustice, and corruption.
They also have intimidated surrounding civilians. This has been
achieved through violence: attacks on Shi`a sites in Iraq, on police
and contract workers, as well as the now infamous kidnappings
and beheadings of so-called “apostates” and “inﬁdels.” Brutal
kidnappings and murders of civilians took place during the Lebanese
civil war, and a huge number of people remain unaccounted for.121
Widescale coercion in the form of violence against local populations
also took place in the GIA massacres in Algeria that peaked in 1997
and evidenced a smaller peak in 1994.
In Iraq, kidnappings of foreigners, or “apostates,” were used in
efforts to force troop withdrawals, discourage international businesses and agencies, obtain ransoms, postpone the formal installation
of diplomats, and attract the attention of sympathizers inside and
outside of Iraq.122 Kidnappings of Iraqis coercively demonstrated
extremist strength and also yielded ransoms and political beneﬁts.
Extremists have attacked Iraqi women who were not wearing hijab
(the headscarf) or abaya (the outer robe) and barbers who shave men’s
beards and cut their hair in modern styles. But the suicide attacks
have been most devastating to Iraqis, causing despair, even to Grand
Ayatollah al-Sistani who described the ﬁghting as “genocidal.”123
Suicide attacks will likely continue, and, if tighter security measures
are not employed, they will, no doubt, be utilized again in the West.
Israelis adopted the most logical tactics, employing security guards
to search bags outside of every large store and inspect passengers
boarding public transport.
We might like to believe that such actions illustrate the
desperation of extremists, or that massacres and bombings by
extremists eventually will hurt their cause. But this has not always
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been the case. Islamists feel they are demonstrating superior and
morally necessary force. Moderates sometimes support extremists
for defying the United States, or un-Islamic governments and
local populations may be hedging their bets, playing it safe by not
castigating those who threaten them. When the object of Islamist
violence can be demonized as an outsider, then, of course, violence is
perceived differently. So Hizbullah, which initially exerted coercion
against civilians (against liquor stores and coffee houses where men
play games like backgammon) and fought other Lebanese, eventually
reserved its violent actions for Israelis. As a result, the organization
is feared but also respected by the Lebanese population. Hamas, alAqsa Brigades, and Islamic Jihad rationalize their violence against
Israelis by pointing out that every Israeli is a combatant since all serve,
or will serve, in the armed forces. As for the effect of unpredictable
small- or medium-scale attacks, we have seen that they do disrupt
daily life and that negotiation may result, as, for example, in the
response to the attacks of the al-Aqsa Intifadha.
Attempting to remove the jihad from the jihadi, the allure of
the freedom-ﬁghter, is a delicate task. Somehow this task must be
accomplished to erode sanctuary, but it cannot be accomplished in
the style of 19th century missionaries. To date, the widely-viewed
television program, “In the Grip of Justice,” in Iraq has managed to
tarnish jihadi allure in a terrorist reality show that reveals the base,
cowardly, and Islamically unsound nature of captured insurgents.
In select shows, two Shi`a cells of hitmen admitted that they worked
for Zarqawi’s movement, shocking members of both sects. This is
the ﬂip side of recruitment videos.
However popular an Iraqi reality show is, the tactic of
discreditation is a two-edged sword. How credible is the force that
tolerated the criminal behavior at Abu Ghraib (thus far, Muslims and
Arabs have read that a criminal process is ongoing, but that only a
few perpetrators were charged and there were legal problems with
their prosecution) or the “softening” tactics, lack of habeus corpus,
and unspeciﬁed terms of conﬁnement at Guantanamo Bay? These
problems, while representative in the least of American intentions,
were nevertheless very damaging to the U.S. moral position. Also,
many Iraqis believe that the former “insurgents” have been beaten
into their testimony; some footage from the above mentioned
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program, including that screened on al-`Arabiyya television, features
sound track dubbing. Whether or not it is actually read by an actor,
a portion of the Arab public believes this to be the case.
In sum, there is a disjuncture between the mujahidins’ ultimate
goals and their present abilities. But we cannot narrowly focus on
this chink in Islamist armor, nor merely on eliminating leadership
or discouraging recruitment. We need to encourage Muslim and
Middle Eastern governments to carry out these tasks simultaneously
while establishing trust in their own political systems to provide an
alternative for would-be jihadists of the future. Similarly, if we set
our goals at the elimination of a few select groups that most clearly
resemble al-Qa’ida, we will fail to comprehend the 100 Osamas
now emerging and their likely future impact. If we discredit Islam,
Muslim discourse, and Islamic education, we win few friends and
foster many enemies.
The impact of Islamist discourse is ampliﬁed further by the
extensive reach of moderate ideas today. These convey a sense of
commitment to Muslim ideals. So, as efforts to reform and democratize
proceed in some parts of the Muslim world, a greater number of
Islamists will attain political power. This is a cause for concern, and a
careful and cautious weighing of the costs and beneﬁts of our tactics
in the War on Terror. A new Hundred Years War is as likely as the
emergence of 100 Osamas. If we can encourage the transformation
of certain of those 100 into viable political leaders, if they forswear
violence and can compel their followers to follow suit, then we can
narrow the scope of that future war. If we carefully consider those
elements of our foreign policies in the Middle East and the Muslim
world that can encourage a locally-driven democratization and
greater trust in the U.S. stewardship of global power, that will be to
the good. All of this can be done by remembering that all politics are
local, and that pragmatism and idealism are not necessarily forces
that cancel each other out.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Some recommendations follow.
1. Revise strategies that narrowly deﬁne extremist networks and their
modus operandi. The ﬁve groups with ascertainable ties to al-Qa’ida
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may relatively soon (within a few years) be neutralized, but by that
time, 10 to 15 or more different groups may be exerting pressure
elsewhere.
2. Revise approaches that too broadly deﬁne terrorism and extremism
and our responses to them. Regional, ideological, and country speciﬁcity
is essential.
3. Acknowledge the evolution and change of Islamist extremist
leadership and develop strategies to contain it. Co-optation and
elimination are, in essence, no more than methods to contain
these movements. No centralized Islamic authority exists that can
excommunicate renegade leaders who are, in any case, regarded
more as popular heroes, members of a resistance—insurgents, rather
than terrorists. Yet, ideological, political, and intelligence methods
must be employed against them. Broaden counterterrorist responses
to go beyond leadership to the lower levels of organizations and
their sympathizers. Utilize those who know the operating bases
well and speak the appropriate languages, instead of relegating this
enormously difﬁcult task to those who have no deep understanding
of the area, the issues, or their delicacy.
4. Focus on antiterrorist as well as counterterrorist principles.
Denying friendly waters or sanctuary can take place only where
citizens perceive the beneﬁts of their participation in any given
social or political system. That is why democratization, or at least the
establishment of just, representative, and effective political systems in
the region, is key. Beyond that, we need to foster the concept of “world
citizens” who band together against new challenges, and attempt to
break down the xenophobias that divide us. That said, antiterrorist
campaigns must go beyond propaganda, advertisement, and empty
promises to protect the public, and address the ideological themes of
insurgency, terrorism, and speciﬁcally, extremist Islamism.
5. Understand and respond to the increasing sophistication of Islamist
tactical and strategic efforts. In this monograph, I have outlined the
progress of radical Islamist thought at the leadership level. Theories
of cultural superiority always are treacherous. We should not imagine
that, because Western militaries have been more effective than those
in Muslim countries, leadership cannot be cultivated or represent
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any kind of challenge to a technologically superior force. Extremist
Muslims could penetrate armed forces in the region. In fact, the
Egyptian and Saudi governments have been concerned about the
presence of jihadists in their armed forces or police and rightly so,
if we remember al-`Awﬁ, al-Islambuli, and others. Extremists will
certainly further challenge the new Iraqi military and security forces
if the United States withdraws from the country. But these forces,
along with local political leadership, are going to be the point at
which the war against terror is won or lost. We should then support
them through all possible avenues.
6. Carefully consider the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East
and in other areas of the Muslim world on the stated aims of the Global War
on Terror. The Palestinian issue is of paramount importance to many
of the Muslim Middle Eastern countries and has become important
even to Muslim countries outside the Middle East. Clear public
statements about America’s relationship with Israel and long-term
interests in Iraq and Afghanistan all require open communication
and some modiﬁcations and resolution, or they will continue to be
used as evidence of pervasive American hypocrisy.
7. Continue working with local governments in their counterterrorist
efforts. This, in turn, requires careful attention to the lessons learned
by local leadership, and representatives of civil society. But we
should condemn the use of inhumane practices and help local forces
resist inﬁltration by Islamist extremist forces into security, military,
or police forces, wherever possible.
8. Establish centers for international counterterrorist operations
to speciﬁcally address the threat posed by Islamist extremists. These
should make use of international resources and knowledge of these
groups and go far beyond name-sharing. Building on the February
2005 proposal of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and some recent
suggestions of Australian governmental representatives, these
centers might be set up with Saudi, Australian (for Southeast Asia),
South and Central Asian, and North African/European focuses.
While Islam should not be singled out as the only religion to have
produced violent, purist, or separatist movements, these centers
would do well to focus on this particular manifestation of violent
extremism, rather than diluting their programs to ﬁt all possible
global circumstances.
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9. Continue making legitimate efforts to obtain and coordinate
information concerning the interaction, travel, and whereabouts of
Islamist extremists. The use of physical and psychological torture
and extralegal procedures is counterproductive to the moral terrain
necessary for the establishment of a terror-free world.
10. Encourage local governments to normalize relations with certain
Islamist groups, and utilize dialogue programs or amnesty efforts, where
appropriate, in order to return supporters of jihad to society. Rehabilitation
and the forswearing of violence can be monitored. We should
encourage local authorities to provide alternatives to ﬁghting that
include a wage and possibly a commitment to social welfare.
11. Recognize the potential of moderate Islamist groups and actors to
participate in the political process. As with the legitimization of Islamist
parties in Iraq, such parties have a role to play elsewhere in the
region, where they would express the popular will in open and free
elections. While the author is concerned about the rights of women
and minorities and freedom of expression and religion, compromises
with such moderate groups are far more likely than with their
extremist counterparts, and they can, if they are motivated to do
so, help to constrain indiscriminate acts of violence. Policymakers
should acknowledge that Islamist moderates, or even governmentlinked conservatives, will not see eye-to-eye with Americans on
a variety of issues related to the GWOT. That does not mean that
we go our way and they go theirs. But we should not behave as
neocolonialists, dictating judicial practice in legal systems other than
our own, or requiring popular amnesia of the political wounds dealt
by authoritarian governments.
12. Energetic diplomacy should be utilized to achieve mutual
understanding on the relevant issues or obstacles to a more “global” pursuit
of the Global War on Terror. This should be carried out by professional
diplomats, but also by articulate citizens, businessmen and women,
and members of the military and other professions.
13. Establish a multi-country full media (Web, television, radio, and
print) program to discuss and debate Islamist and other forms of religious
extremism. It is particularly important that such communications
be made in the local languages, and at a fairly sophisticated level
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that will not insult the intelligence of viewers and readers in the
Muslim world, and which also will serve the purpose of educating
the Western public about the complexity of the issues. Discussion
of other “extremist” ideas ranging from Muslim questions about
Christian efforts to proselytize and convert Muslims, to the role of
other religious nationalisms (Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian)
is important here, if indeed, Islamic extremism is not being treated as
a unique phenomenon.
14. Stay the course in promoting democratization of the region. This
monograph lacked space to explain the difﬁculties of promoting
democracy while battling extremism. The 100 Osamas are, by and
large, opposed to democratization, as was mentioned above, because
such movements compete with their own and encourage other
values, like pluralism, personal freedoms, and populism. While
local allies have and will continue to object to the destabilization that
democratic transformation may carry, blind authoritarianism has
no more future in the Muslim world than in the Christian one. The
democratization process will be slow and painful, but the building
of stakeholders, those with an investment in their society’s future, is
more essential to the future of counterinsurgency than any stockpiling
of armored vehicles or antimortar weaponry. One point made in
this monograph is that it may not diminish the thirst for an Islamic
lifestyle, and the role of moderate Islamism in democratization needs
to be considered.
15. Provide advanced training to military, intelligence, and political
leaders on the history, evolution, and tactics of Islamist extremists that
goes far beyond the current typical single-session brieﬁngs or
conference-style meetings based on discussion models in which
expert information is occluded by interpretation, political opinions,
and misunderstandings of basic features of Islam.

62

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
`Alim: Muslim cleric, literally means enlightened one. `Ulama is the plural
form.
`Asala: Cultural authenticity.
Bay`a: A Muslim oath of allegiance sworn to the Caliph. A symbolic
demonstration of the Caliph’s political and religious legitimacy.
Confessional group. Ofﬁcially recognized religious sect in Lebanon, often
described as a polity moving toward a confessional democracy. Also means
a religious sect in other countries.
Da`wah: Islamic mission. In the contemporary period, refers to
proselytization, awakening “born but unconscious” Muslims, urging them
to adopt an Islamist agenda, or merely to more faithfully adhere to their
religious duties.
Dhurwat Sanam al-Islam: Crest of the Summit of Islam. A term meaning
jihad, and also the title of a recent web-publication.
Fard `Ayn: Obligatory in Islamic terms.
Fatwa: A juridical response to a question about Islamic law, usually couched
in terms of the Islamically-permitted nature of any given item or practice.
Hadith: A secondary source for Islamic jurisprudence, for producing
juridical opinions (fatawa or responsa) grounded in Islamic law. A hadith
is a short text concerning the opinions, words, or practice of the Prophet
Muhammad, or sometimes his Companions, or those close to him. It is
preceded by a chain of transmittors called an isnad. In Sunni Islam, the
ﬁrst source to be consulted is the Qur’an, and then those hadith collections
considered to be authoritative. Consensus and analogy are other approved
sources for jurisprudence.
Al-Haras al-Watani: The pagan guard, as the mujahidin of Iraq term the
U.S.-trained Iraqi forces.
Hijra (Higra in Egyptian dialect): The emigration of the ﬁrst Muslims from
Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D.
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Hiraba: A crime in Islamic law, taking or destroying the property of others,
brigandry. Also rape is classiﬁed by some in this category.
Intifadha: Uprising. Literally means a “shaking off.”
Islamic Republican Party (IRP) of Iran: Clerics who were followers and former
students of Ayatollah Khomeini established this party in February 1979. It
became the dominant force in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Ja`fari: Of the Shi`i legal school known as the Ja`fariyya; Twelve Shiites, as
in Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan.
Jahiliyya: The time of ignorance and barbarism, before Islam. Islamist
extremists charge contemporary society of being in a state of jahiliyya
today.
Kuttab: Qur’anic school, or class at the elementary level.
Madrasa: General term for a school, public or private, secular or religious.
Refers as well to a college or academy of Islamic thought and sciences.
Majlis al-shura: A council of consultation, a methodology for governance
which Islamists prefer to Western-style democracy. This same term also
stands for the Parliaments or councils of various governments.
Mu`asara: Modernity.
Nahda: Rennaisance. Also the name of the Arabic literary revival.
Neo-Salaﬁst: A category of extremists who have more recently gained
popularity. To be distinguished from “early” or original salaﬁsts or purists.
For example, certain neo-salaﬁsts became more popular in Saudi Arabia
since the Gulf War of 1991.
Qa’idin: Those who sit and simply talk or reﬂect on jihad but who will not
join the armed struggle.
Al-Qa’ida ﬁ al-Jazirat al-`Arabiyya: al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula
(QAP), the Islamist extremist movement in Saudi Arabia.
Raﬁdhin; Renegades, those guilty of sedition. Zarqawi’s term for the Iraqi
Shi`a.
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Sahwa Islamiyya: Islamic awakening; sometimes referred to as tayar Islami
(Islamic trend).
Sha`b or `Amma: Ordinary people, common folk, or the “Arab street.”
Siyar: The Muslim “law of nations” or international law.
Suhba: Guidance, the spiritual companionship of the group—an experience
provided by Suﬁ brotherhoods, Muslim educational systems, and Islamist
radical associations.
Tabarruj al-nisa’: The illicit display of women’s bodies in Western fashion,
according to those who support Islamic modest dress.
Takﬁr: To call someone an unbeliever, to charge a Muslim of being sinful or
even with apostasy (rejecting his/her faith).
Ta`lim: Education, enlightenment.
Tarbiyya: Guidance in the sense of training and proper upbringing or
vocational knowledge versus enlightenment, and social responsibility
rather than the highly individual pursuit of union with God.
Tawhid: Oneness, or unicity of God.
Wasta: Mediation, or intercession, or an intermediary who can provide
access. Similar to the Farsi term, parti.
Vilayat e-faqih: Governance by an Islamic jurist. Khomeini elaborated on
this theory in a book on Islamic governance.

65

ENDNOTES
1. Husni Mubarak, Televised Speech, Egyptian Television, March 31, 2003; and
“Egypt’s Mubarak Warns ‘100 Bin Ladens’,” CBS News, March 31, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2003/03/31/world/main547033.shtml.
2. Michael Howard, “Civilians Bear Brunt of Iraqi Insurgency.” The Guardian, July 15,
2005; Sabrina Tavernese, “Data Shows Rising Toll of Iraqis From Insurgency,” New York
Times, July 14, 2005.
3. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Iraq Puts Civilian Toll at 12,000,” Washington Post Foreign Service,
June 3, 2005, p. A1.
4. New York Times, July 14, 2005.
5. Dan Murphy, “US Strategy in Iraq: Is It Working?” Christian Science Monitor, June 21,
2005.
6. Dawn Internet Edition, August 9, 2005, at http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/09/int9.htm.
7. Personal interviews with al-Aqsa brigade commander and ﬁghters, June 27, 2004.
8. Tawhid, a key principle in Islam means the oneness, universality, and omnipresence
of Allah. It is often translated as “unity” and misinterpreted in the media and by the general
public as “uniformity.” Tawhid has particular implications for Wahhabi, neo-salaﬁ, Druze
(who call themselves muwahhidun), and other Muslim groups.
9. Brisard cites U.S. v. Enaam Arnaout, 02CR892, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, January 29, 2003; Jean-Charles Brisard with Damien Martinez, Zarqawi: The New
Face of Al-Qaeda, New York: Other Press, from Zarkaoui, le nouveu visage d’AlQaida, Paris:
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2005, p. 68.
10. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Carol Volk, trans., Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994; Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Anthony F. Roberts,
trans., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. It should be noted that strong
critics of political Islam like Dan Pipes ridiculed this European thesis of post-Islamism.
11. Porter J. Goss, “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges
with a Long-Term Strategy,” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence Before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005.
12. While some welcomed this change in terminology, see Kim Holmes, “What’s in
a Name? ‘War on Terror’ Out, ‘Struggle Against Extremism’ In,” Heritage Foundation
WebMemo #805, July 26, 2005, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm805.
cfm205. The U.S. administration did not, after all, abandon “war on terror.”
13. Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie, eds., Shi’ism and Social Protest, New Haven, CT: Yale
University, 1986; Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1986; W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity, New
York: Routledge, 1988; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1980; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Egypt’s
Islamic Activism in the 1980s,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 1988, and other
country cases in that same issue; Richard Tapper, Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics
and Literature in a Secular State, London: I. B. Tauris, 1991; Mahmoud Mohammed Taha,
translation and introduction, Abdullahi al-Naim; The Second Message of Islam, Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1987; Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988; Ahmad Moussalli, Sayyid Qutb: Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, Beirut:

67

American University of Beirut, 1992; and idem, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism:
The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy and the Islamic State, Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1999; Ziad Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994; Hisham Ahmad,
Hamas: From Religious Salvation to Political Trransformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian
Society, Jerusalem, Israel: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International
Affairs, 1994; Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam, New York: Routledge, 1991; Seyyed Vali Nasr,
The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994; François Burgat, L’Islamisme en Face, Paris: La Découverte, 1995, trans.
as Face to Face With Political Islam, I. B. Tauris, 2003; John Esposito, ed., Islam in Asia: Religion,
Politics and Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987; and idem, The Islamic Threat:
Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford, 1992; James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and
the Gulf Crisis, Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991; Denis Sullivan and
Sana Abed Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1999; Abdulaziz Sachedina, “Activist Shi’ism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon,” Mumtaz Ahmad,
“The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat,” John Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni
Arab World: Egypt and Sudan,” and Manning Nash, “Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and
Indonesia,” all in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms Observed,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991; and see the other books in this series such as
Fundamentalisms and Society; Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Islam, Muslims and
the Modern State: Case-Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Countries, London: Macmillan, 1994;
Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity, Reading, UK: Ithaca Books,
1997; and among the newer books, Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman, eds., Public
Islam and the Common Good, Leiden, Holland: Brill, 2004; Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why
Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; and for more journalistic
sources, Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response,
London: Routledge, 2002; Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on
Terror, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004; and Caryle Murphy, Passion for Islam: Shaping
the Modern Middle East, The Egyptian Experience, New York: Scribner, 2002. Arabic sources
reﬂect different debates, for example, the strong one between secularists and Islamists in
Syria. See, Khalid al-`Abbud, ed., Hiwar `ala `ard muhayyida: Wajhan li-wajh (Dialogue on a
Neutral Ground: Face to Face), Damascus: al-Ahali, 1997; or `Abd al-Wahid, `Alwani, al-Islam
wa-l`asr. Tahdiyyat wa afaq (Islam and Modernity: Challenges and Horizons), Damascus: Dar
al-Fikr, 1998.
14. Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran, Jonathan Derrick, trans., New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000; Sherifa Zuhur, Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology
in Contemporary Egypt, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. As with endnote
16, space precludes inclusion of the many sources that discuss these themes.
15. Gilles Kepel, Le Prophète et Pharaon: Aux sources des mouvements islamistes, Paris:
La Découverte, 1984, and in translation by University of California Press, 1985; Emmanuel
Sivan, Radical Islam, Medieval Theology, and Modern Politics, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1985.
16. Sherifa Zuhur and Youssef Aboul-Enein, Islamic Rulings on Warfare, Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2004; `Umar Ibn Ibrahim al-Awasi al-Ansari, Tafrij al-qurub ﬁ
tadbir al-hurub, George T. Scanlon, ed. and trans., Cairo: American University of Cairo Press,
1961; Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Kitab al-siyar al-kabir) Majid Khadduri, trans.,
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966; Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam,
Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996.

68

17. Kamal Salama al-Daqs, Ayat al-jihad ﬁ al-Qur’an al-karim (Verses of Jihad in the
Qur’an), Kuwait: Dar al-Bayan, 1972, p. 105.
18. State of the Union (2005) Address at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/0
2/20050202-11.html.
19. “President Discusses War on Terror,” National Defense University, Fort Lesley J.
McNair, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03.
20. Michael Vlahos, “The Muslim Renovatio and U.S. Strategy,” at http://www.
techcentralstation.com/042704D.html.
21. Sherifa Zuhur, “What’s New in the New Islamic Discourse?” presented at the
Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, University of Melbourne, July 29,
2004.
22. Like a zawaj al-mut`a, a Shi’i form of contract marriage, a perceptive analogy from
Nimrod Raphaeli.
23. This is implied elsewhere, as well, in the responses of Muslim governments that
Islam has been “hijacked”; or in the subtitle to John Esposito’s book, “Terror in the Name of
Islam,” Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, New York: Oxford University, 2000.
24. The phrase, the “end of history,” is identiﬁed with Francis Fukuyama, who, in
a seminal article of that title, argued that liberal democracy might be the “end point of
mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “ﬁnal form of human government.” Shortly
thereafter, the Soviet Union collapsed. He then wrote The End of History and the Last Man,
New York: Penguin, 1992. See Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest,
Summer, 1989; Henry Allen, “The End. Or Is It?” Washington Post, September 27, 1989. He
was questioned about the role of Islamism because his ideas do not suggest it as a political
alternative in a public appearance. He denied any existential appeal of Islamism, claiming
that political Islam is “political and not religious.” See http://maroon.uchicago.edu/news/
articles/2005/02/12/end_of_history_schol.php.
25. One example can be found at http://www.muhajabah.com/reallysays.htm.
26. The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His messenger and
strive with might and main for mischief through the land is execution or cruciﬁxion, or
the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land, Qur’an, V:33.
For commentary, see `Abdullah Yusuf `Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, Beltsville, Md:
Amana, 1999, 2001, p. 257.
27. Sherifa Zuhur, “Syria: A Terrorist Haven?” Terrorism Focus, Vol. II, Issue 14, August
13, 2005.
28. Stephen Ulph, “New Jihadist Group Emerges in Syria,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. II,
Issue 12, June 24, 2005.
29. Soroush’s website is at http://www.drsoroush.com/Persian.htm (or in English at the
same URL), or see Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, Mahmoud
Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, trans., London and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
30. Muhammad Sa`id Ramadan al-Buti, al-Salaﬁyya: Marhala zamaniyya mubaraka la
madhhab Islami, Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1998.
31. `Abd al-Salam Yasin, al-Ihsan, Casablanca: Matbu`at al-Ufuq, 1998; Yasin, al-Islam
bayna al-da`wa wa al-dawla: al-Minhaj al-nabawi li-taghyir al-insan, Casablanca: Matba`at alNajah, 1972; or al-Islam ghadan: al`Amal al-Islami wa harakiyya al-minhaj al-nabawi ﬁ zaman
al-ﬁtna, Casablanca: Matba`at al-Najah, 1973.

69

32. Personal interview with `Isam al-`Aryan, Cairo 1988. Also see Murphy, Passion for
Islam, pp. 115-123, 128-130.
33. Gihan Shahine, “A Preacher’s Journey,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 5-11, 2003, at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/641/eg11.htm; Gihan Shahine, “Preacher on the Run,” AlAhram Weekly, December 12-18, 2002; Lindsay Wise, “‘Words from the Heart’: New Forms
of Islamic Preaching in Egypt,” M.Phil. Thesis, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University,
2003.
34. Fahmi Huwaydi, Al-Islam wa al-Dimuqratiyya, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li al-Tarjuma
wa al-Nashr, 1993.
35. “As long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny and despair and anger,
it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the safety of America and
our friends. So America is pursuing a forward strategy of freedom in the greater Middle
East,” State of the Union Address, released January 20, 2004; also see the President’s March
8, 2005, speech on terrorism delivered at the National Defense University, http:/www.cnn.
com/2005/allpolitics/03108/bush.trancript.
36. John Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 24,
No. 4, Winter 2003, at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1048/2/.
37. Tatawwa`iyya is volunteerism, an aspect of private philanthropy and charitable
activities. See, for example, Denis Sullivan, “Islam and Development in Egypt: Civil Society
and the State,” Mutalib and Hashmi, eds., Islam, Muslims and the Modern State, pp. 211-231.
38. Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Mass Wedding: Check the Bride at the Door,”
Jerusalem Post, July 29, 2005.
39. Personal interviews conducted in Jerusalem, May 22-23, 2005.
40. Personal interview with Abdullah al-Qarawi, June 28, 2005. Al-Qarawi, leader of
the Jericho Brigade, had turned over weapons to the Palestinian Authority, whose security
forces then turned on his brigade. He escaped, but his men were seized. Reports that his
men were being tortured were received from an inside source at the military detention
center. Palestinians consider Al-Qarawi and Zakariya Zbayda in Jenin to be effective
commanders.
41. Gershon Baskin, “Fragmented Beyond Repair?” Jerusalem Post, July 25, 2005;
Khaled Duzdar, “Moving Backwards,” IPCRI News Service, July 23, 2005. Israelis carried
their opposition to the Gaza withdrawal into the streets, with orange banners and clothing,
while the pro-withdrawal side wore blue. The Palestinians worry that no meaningful
Israeli-Palistinian negotiations will follow disengagement.
42. Personal interview with Shaykh Hasan Yousef of Hamas, June 28, 2005.
43. Scott Wilson and Molly Moore, “Egypt Inquiry Slowed by Lack of Evidence;
Homegrown Cell Inspired by Al Qaeda is Suspected in Attacks on Red Sea Resorts,”
Washington Post, October 23, 2004; Sherifa Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt,”
Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 10, May 19 2005, at http://www.jamestown.org.
44. Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Broken Crescent: The “Threat” of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism, New York: National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 1998, 2002, p. 199.
45. “They cannot tolerate those who differ with them, certainly not long enough to
obtain power. Impatient for that power, they begin to purge society even before they rule,
with disastrous results for themselves.” Martin Kramer, “The Mismeasure of Political
Islam,” M. Kramer, ed., The Islamism Debate, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv
University, 1997, p. 170.

70

46. Tariq al-Bishri, Al-Haraka al-Siyasiyya ﬁ Misr, 1945–52, Cairo: n.p., 1972.
47. The Islamic Liberation Party operated in the United Kingdom and, although it was
banned in 2005, ran a small hotel in the area off Edgeware Road/Marble Arches which has
a large Muslim population.
48. S.a.w.s. stands for salla Allahu alayhi wa sallam, or peace be upon him, and is included
after the mention of the Prophet Muhammad.
49. Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response, pp.
71-73.
50. Sherifa Zuhur, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Threat, Political Reform, and the Global War on
Terror, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, pp. 21-22;
Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition, Washington Institute
Policy Paper, 2000.
51. Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, al-Farida al-gha`iba. (pamphlet) n.p., n.d.; see also
G. H. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the
Middle East, New York: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 163-164.
52. Also see Roberto Marin-Guzman, “Fanaticism: A Major Obstacle in the MuslimChristian Dialogue. The Case of Twentieth Century Islamic Fundamentalism,” Arab Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 25, Issue 3, Summer 2003.
53. Abdullah Azzam, Join the Caravan. London: Azzam Publications, 2nd edition,
2001.
54. Scott Atran with Tauﬁq Andrie, “The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,
Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization,” conducted August
13 and 15, 2005. Received from Jamestown Foundation Broadcast, September 15, 2005.
55. One could contrast this more radical approach with the more moderate aims of
the Muslim Brotherhood, as in Jamal al-Banna, al-Farida al-Ghaiba: Jihad al-nafs am Jihad alsaif? Cairo: Dar al-Thabit, 1984. Babar Ahmad, now ﬁghting extradition from the United
Kingdom to the United States for his role in a network of websites promoting Islamist
extremism, established a site in 1996 called azzam.com, in honor of bin Ladin’s mentor.
56. Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, p. 120.
57. “Militants Shun Abbas Unity Offer,” BBC News, July 8, 2005.
58. Los Angeles Times, June 23, 2005.
59. Personal conversations with Shallah in his capacity as editor of Qira’at Siyasiyah.
60. Quoted in Ehud Sprinzak, “Rational Fanatics,” Foreign Policy, September/October
200, p. 68.
61. Sherifa Zuhur, Saudi Arabia, pp. 22-23; Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama bin
Laden: Global Terrorism & the Bin Laden Brotherhood, Durham: Duke University, 2002.
62. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror,
Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004.
63. “CIA Agents Told To Deliver bin Laden’s Head on Ice,” May 4, 2005; The Pew Global
Attitudes Survey, July 14, 2005, entitled “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim
and Western Publics Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics.” Some indicators
show that support for extremism has waned, but the report reveals very unfavorable views
of Jewish and Christian minorities, and that support for suicide bombings in Jordan has

71

grown and remained constant in Turkey. Moreover, Pakistani and Jordanian support for
bin Ladin grew.
64. To those mujahidin who wanted to travel to Iraq to wage jihad. Posted June 25,
2004, and is available on http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1169117/posts, last visited
4/12/05.
65. Personal observation, Riyadh, March 2005.
66. “Al-Qaeda: In Decline or Preparing for the Next Attack? An Interview with Saad alFaqih,” Spotlight on Terror, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. III, Issue 5, June 15, 2005, Interview
with Mahan Abedin.
67. “Al-Qaeda in Decline.”
68. Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005. Gerges makes the point that many groups did not join up with alQa’ida, and that Egyptian Islamic Jihad was damaged by doing so, see pp. 175, 176; that alQa’ida faces war on two fronts as well, with the West and its own disputing factions; and he
concludes that the group has lost the war for Muslim minds, p. 270. This sounds to me like
wishful thinking, although Gerges calls for us to rein in the GWOT since Islamic moderates
have a role in the region, and that resembles my argument.
69. Samir Rafaat, “Ayman al-Zawahri The World’s Second Most Wanted Man,”
November 1, 2001, at http://www.egy.com/people. Zawahiri’s family history was misreported
by a number of sources.
70. Nemat Guenena, “The ‘Jihad’: An ‘Islamic Alternative’ in Egypt,” Cairo Papers in
Social Science, Vol. 9, Monograph 2, Summer, 1986, p. 67.
71. Guenena, The Jihad, p. 55.
72. Fawaz A. Gerges, “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Cost and
Prospects,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 53/54, No. 4, Fall 2000.
73. Guenena, The Jihad, p. 43, 44.
74. See al-Ahrar, December 14, 1981; or as included in al-Fatawa al-Islamiyya min Dar
al-Ifta al-Misriyya, Cairo: 1983, pp. 3762-3792.
75. Ibid, and for a discussion of the Sword Verses, see Aboul–Enein and Zuhur, Islamic
Rulings on Warfare, p. 7, 8, 10-12.
76. Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, pp. 161-167.
77. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Fursan tahta rayat al-nabi, Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Islamiyyah,
2002, published in al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 2-12, 2001. For those who cannot read
Arabic, a brief book review may be helpful. See Youssef Aboul-Enein, “Ayman AlZawahiri’s Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto,” Military Review,
Vol. 85, Issue 1, January/February 2005.
78. Al-Jazeera, August 4, 2005; English text, BBC News, August 4, 2005, at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4746157.stm.
79. John Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan,”
Fundamentalisms Observed, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., p. 389; Andrew
Hammond, “Between the Ballot and the Bullet: Egypt’s War on Terrorism,” World Press
Review Online, November 15, 2001, at http://www.worldpress.org/mideast/1114web_egypt.htm;
Neil MacFarquhar, “Islamic Jihad, Forged in Egypt, Is Seen as bin Laden’s Backbone,” New
York Times, October 4, 2001; Caryle Murphy, Passion for Islam.

72

80. “The Black Hole: The Fate of Islamists Rendered to Egypt,” Human Rights Watch,
May 2005, at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0505/; “Hostage Taking and Abuse of Female
Detainees,” Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org/about/projects/womrep/General-108.
htm.
81. Juan Cole, a Middle East expert at the University of Michigan, is one of those
supporting this view.
82. Bassam al-Baddarin, “Al-Qaeda Has Drawn Up a Working Strategy lasting until
2020,” al-Quds al-Arabi, March 11, 2005; Stephen Ulph, “Al-Qaeda’s Strategy Until 2020,”
Insurgency and Jihad, Jamestown Foundation, April 11, 2005.
83. Ibid.
84. “Yusuf al-Qaradawi Tells BBC Newsnight that Islam Justiﬁes Suicide Bombings,”
BBC Press Ofﬁce, July 7, 2004, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressofﬁce/pressreleases/stories/2004/07_
july/07/newsnight.shtml.
85. Al-Hayat, April 25, 2001.
86. Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, Sydney:
University of New South Wales Press, 2004. Also see C. Watson who argues that Indonesian
Muslims have responded in three ways to state repression of their interests over the last
century: retreating or turning inward; engaging in public protest; and using the political
system to increase their own power within it. C. W. Watson, “Muslims and the State in
Indonesia,” in Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, eds., Islam, Muslims and the Modern
State.
87. International Crisis Group, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and
the Australian Embassy Bombing,” Asia Report No. 92, Singapore/Brussels, February 22,
2005.
88. ABC/Radio Australia, Thursday, March 11, 2004; and al-Jazeera Net, March 11,
2004.
89. Haroon Siddiqui, “Americans Alienate Indonesia,” Toronto Star, April 7, 2005.
The future of tighter policies to promote the GWOT in Indonesia now confronts public
sentiment against agents of Indonesia’s National Intelligence Agency who were allegedly
involved in murdering human rights activist Munir Said Thalib. Munir charged that special
forces had kidnapped civil rights activists in 1997-98, who were then executed by the army.
“Indonesia’s Security Agency Probed,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, July 15, 2005.
90. Atran and Andrie, “The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.”
91. http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres?...F5DDB7D23C2.htm, broadcast on July 3, 2005;
and http://www.alghad.jo/index.php broadcast on July 5, 2005.
92. Reuven Paz, “Islamic Legitimacy for the London Bombings,” Project for the
Research of Islamist Movements, Vol. 3, No. 4, July 2005.
93. Peter Willems, “The Dialogue Committee is Known Internationally,” Yemen Times,
July 18, 2005; Michael Taarnby, “Yemen’s Committee for Dialogue: Can Jihadists Return to
Society?” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 4, July 15, 2005.
94. Statement by Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director for the
Middle East and North Africa, National Democratic Institute for Democratic Affairs,
Testimony to the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation, U.S.
House of Representatives, held March 3, 2005.

73

95. Letter seized by U.S. forces, on January 23, 2004; included in Appendices, Brisard,
Zarqawi, pp. 233-251.
96. Kreikar disavowed this information which nonetheless appears in various sources.
See Dilip Hiro, Secrets and Lies: Operation “Iraqi Freedom” and After, New York: Nation Books,
2004, p. 124.
97. Al-Bayyinah, March 5, 2005.
98. Letter, January 23, 2004; included in Appendices, Brisard, Zarqawi, pp. 235-241.
99. Ruling issued in Case No. 127/24 (Constitutional) ﬁled by Nadia Eskandar Michael
against the President of the Republic, Speaker of People’s Assembly, Prime Minister, and
Phillips Zacharia Mina, on June 2, 2005.
100. “A Message from a Soldier to a Commander,” Zarqawi’s tape to Usama bin
Ladin.
101. Ibid.
102. His book is Da’wat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya. Murad al-Shishani, “Abu Mus`ab
al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salaﬁ-Jihadists,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 16,
August 11, 2005.
103. See, for example, General John Abizaid’s June testimony to Congress, in which he
noted the increased presence of foreign ﬁghters and that the insurgency was as strong as it
had been 6 months previously. “Abizaid: Insurgency Still Strong,” Christian Science Monitor,
June 24, 2005, at http://csmonitor.com/2005/0624/dailyUpdate.html; and New York Times, July
24, 2005.
104. See, for instance, Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, “Jihadists Turn the Web into
Base of Operations,” The Washington Post, August 7, 2005; and idem, “The Web as Weapon,”
The Washington Post, August 9, 2005; Dan Murphy, “Iraq, Internet Fuel Growth of Global
Jihad,” Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 2005 edition; numerous articles in Terrorism Focus
2004-05; “The New Al-Qaeda: jihad.com” BBC News, July 20, 2005, at http://www.bbc.co.uk,
which describes Part 1 of Peter Taylor’s The New Al-Qaeda, aired on BBC 2; Jack Kelley,
“Militants Wire Web with Links to Jihad,” USA Today, July 10, 2002; Reuven Paz, “Qa’idat
al-Jihad: A New Name on the Road to Palestine,” May 7, 2002, at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/
articledet.cfm?articleid=436.
105. Posted at http://ekhlas.com/forum. See Stephen Ulph, “New Online Book Lays Out
al-Qaeda’s Military Strategy,” Terrorism Monitor, April 11, 2005.
106. Salim al-Makki, ““Believers Exact Sweet Revenge,” formerly posted at Alneda.com,
October 14, 2002; Abu Ubayd al-Quarashi, “A Lesson of War,” at www.al-Ansar, December
19, 2002; and Sayf al-Din al-Ansari, “The Washington and New York Raid,” at jihad.net; then
quoted collectively in Michael Scheuer, “Coalition Warfare: How al-Qa’ida Uses the World
Islamic Front Against Crusaders and Jews,” Part 1, Terrorism Focus, Vol. II, Issue 7, March
31, 2005.
107. http://www.nnuu.org, last visited July 11, 2005.
108. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrasa Myth,” New York Times, June 14,
2005.
109. BBC News, July 29, 2005.
110. “Seismic Shock in Kuwait,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, Jane’s Security News
Briefs, July 1, 2005.

74

111. For example, here mosque reform is combined with a call for modern education,
as if it does not already exist in the region. “U.S. Strategy in the Muslim World After 9/11,”
Rand Project Air Force Research Brief, 2004. Whether in DoD, universities, or other public
lectures, I frequently respond to audience members who think modern education has not
yet been established in the Muslim world.
112. Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious
Transformation in Egypt, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 233.
113. Personal interviews in Beirut, the South, and the Biqa carried out in the 1980s, 1999,
2000, and 2001. Chartouni-Dubarry, “Hizballah: From Militia to Political Party,” and Giles
Trendle, “Hizballah: Pragmatism and Popular Standing,” in Rosemary Hollis and Nadim
Shehadi, eds, Lebanon on Hold, Oxford: Centre of Lebanese Studies, 1996; Nizar A. Hamzeh,
“Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,” Third
World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1993, pp. 321-337; Augustus Richard Norton, “Lebanon: The
Internal Conﬂict and the Iranian Connection,” in John Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution:
Its Global Impact, Miami, FL: International University Press, 1990; Augustus Richard Norton,
Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals and Mundane Politics, Washington DC: Council on
Foreign Relations, 2000; Sami G. Hajjar, Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation or Menace?
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2002.
114. Based on personal interviews carried out in Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the
Biqa` since 1999.
115. International Crisis Group, “Mr. Abbas Goes to Washington. Can He Still
Succeed?” Middle East Brieﬁng No. 17, Amman/Brussels, May 24, 2005.
116. Personal interview with Shaykh Hasan Yousef, June 28, 2005, Ramallah, West
Bank.
117. Assaf Moghadam, “Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict,” May
2002; Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, No. 2, March/April 2003. This proﬁle may
never have been helpful, but outside of Moghadam’s comments about Palestinians, it
appears in the only detailed criminological/sociological study of Egyptian Islamists. See
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups,” International Journal
of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1980, which surveyed a small number of prisoners.
His ﬁndings were repeated in many studies of Islamism. When much of the population
immigrates from villages to the cities, as in Egypt, and is of a lower middle class social
and economic background, the sample reﬂects the broader population. If such a sample
produced Islamists, then, scholars reasoned, it must be related to social anomie and the stress
of modernization and urbanization. But when the urbanized and educated adopted and
promoted Islamism, this sample no longer reﬂects the social background of all adherents.
118. Miriam Cooke, “Women’s Jihad Before and After September 11,” S. Zuhur, ed.,
Women and Gender in the Middle East and the Muslim World Today, in review; Barbara Victor,
Shahidas: Femmes Kamikazes de Palestines, Montreal: Flammarion Quebec, 2002.
119. Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Post-Modern Perspectives,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 102-103.
120. See http://www.islammemo.cc, last visited July 11, 2005.
121. The Lebanese government estimates 17,415 missing, among whom 13,968 were
classiﬁed as “kidnapped and presumed dead.” “Lebanon,” Human Rights Developments,
Human Rights Watch Organization, at http://www.hrp.org.

75

122. Ibrahim al-Marashi, “Iraq’s Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media, and the
Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2004.
123. James Hider, “Ayatollah’s Despair at ‘Genocide’ of Suicide Bombings,” London
Times, July 19, 2005.

76

